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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION TO ANNEXATION HANDBOOK III
Sources of Tennessee’s Annexation Law
Current Tennessee annexation law consists of:


Article XI, § 9 of the Tennessee Constitution (“The General Assembly shall by
general law provide the exclusive methods by which municipalities may be
created, merged, consolidated and dissolved and by which municipal boundaries
may be altered.”)



Public Acts 1998, Chapter 1101 imposed significant restrictions on municipal
annexations and incorporations and required growth plans be adopted by all the
counties of the state that generally limited where municipal annexations could
occur in those counties. However, it preserved the existing authorized methods
of annexation: ordinance and referendum. But Public Acts 2014, Chapter 707
drastically limits both annexation by ordinance and by referendum until May 16,
2015.



T.C.A., Title 6, Chapter 51, Part One, generally governs annexation by ordinance
and referendum in Tennessee. T.C.A., Title 6, Chapter 58 generally governs
comprehensive growth plans for Tennessee municipalities and counties, and
contains additional requirements for governing annexations. T.C.A., Title 6,
Chapter 51, Parts 2, 3 and 4 govern, respectively, municipal boundary
contractions, municipal boundary adjustments, and municipal mergers. Public
Acts 1998, Chapter 1101, and Public Acts 2014, Chapter 707 are recent
significant changes to Tennessee’s annexation law and are incorporated into
those statutes. Other statutes throughout Tennessee Code Annotated, have a
direct and indirect impact on annexation in Tennessee.



Cases challenging the application of Tennessee’s annexation law. Many such
cases were the product of angry annexation battles between cities and targets of
annexation, between cities and counties, and even between cities and cities over
the past 25-30 years or so. Both Public Acts 1998, Chapter 1101 and Public
Acts 2014, Chapter 707 are a product of those battles.

Purposes of Annexation Handbook III
The Annexation Handbook III has three purposes:
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Provide a guide to answer the question of whether a contemplated annexation is
even legally possible; Public Acts 2014, Chapter 707, made the answer to that
question problematic over the short term, and perhaps over the long term.



To help municipalities determine whether a contemplated annexation makes
sense from political and economic perspectives. Public Acts 1998, Chapter 1101
is responsible for a significant long-term financial obligation of cities to counties
when the former annexes property in the latter. But annexation has many
financial impacts on both the annexing cities and the annexed territory, including
the cost of providing services to the annexed territory.



To reconcile the “old” and the “new” annexation laws, the latter generally wrought
by Public Acts 1998, Chapter 1101, and Public Acts 2014, Chapter 707.

Outline of Annexation Handbook III
Annexation Handbook III is divided into 11 chapters, each of which discusses a discrete
subject in the area of annexation. Following those chapters are a number of appendices
that contain various annexation forms, including a joint MTAS-CTAS publication on how
comprehensive growth plans are amended (as modified by Public Acts 2014, Chapter
707). Annexation Handbooks I and II contained a copy of the annexation laws found in
Tennessee Code Annotated; Annexation Handbook III omits that copy because current
copies of the annexation law are generally available from numerous local sources and
because Tennessee’s annexation law has changed significantly in recent years, and
may change even more in the near future. However Appendix A contains a verbatim
copy of Public Acts 2014, Chapter 707 because of its singular importance.
Annexation Handbook II contained a chapter on “The Right Annexation Done Right.”
That chapter is omitted in Annexation Handbook III because several appendices deal
with recent plans of services that reflect annexation studies that are generally superior
to older ones typical of annexations. They are a good guide to “The Right Annexation
Done Right.”1
CHAPTER 1, INTRODUCTION TO ANNEXATION HANDBOOK III. As the immediate
preceding text indicates, it explains the purpose of Annexation Handbook III, briefly
details the sources of annexation law in Tennessee, and provides a quick review of
what each chapter in Annexation Handbook III contains.
CHAPTER 2, RECENT SIGNIFICANT STATUTORY CHANGES IN TENNESSEE
ANNEXATION LAW, including Public Acts 2014, Chapter 707, which imposes seismic
restrictions on the right of municipalities to annex property, whether by ordinance or by
referendum, unless the permission of the property owners of the affected property is
1

See Appendix A for sample annexation feasibility studies.
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obtained. Other changes in the annexation laws alter some county growth plan
procedures affecting some municipalities.
CHAPTER 3, TAX AND REVENUE IMPLICATIONS OF ANNEXATION, speaks to the
“money” implications of annexation, principally those arising from Public Acts 1998,
Chapter 1101, as amended.
CHAPTERS 4 AND 5, ANNEXATION BY REFERENDUM and ANNEXATION BY
ORDINANCE, respectively, discuss the legal and practical nuts and bolts of annexation,
both by referendum and by ordinance. The legal nuts and bolts are what hold the
annexation machine together. Although annexation by ordinance has an uncertain
future, the chapter on annexation by ordinance is retained because some activity in that
area will be going on until at least May 16, 2015. Those annexation nuts and bolts have
been drastically changed by Public Acts 2014, Chapter 707, although some incomplete
annexations that predate that act may still be on-going, subject to their completion by a
certain date specified in the act. This chapter also deals with the important distinction
between quo warranto challenges to annexation and challenges to annexations brought
under the Declaratory Judgments Act.
CHAPTER 6, PLAN OF SERVICES, discusses the requirement in the annexation laws
that annexing municipalities adopt plans of services for the annexed territories, whether
the annexations are done by ordinance or by referendum. Public Acts 1998, Chapter
1101 made that law much stricter than it had been. Public Acts 2014, Chapter 707
repealed some provisions of Tennessee’s annexation laws, but preserved the laws
governing plans of services, which presently apply to both annexation by ordinance and
annexation by referendum.
CHAPTER 7, “POPULATION BRACKETS” CONTAINED IN THE ANNEXATION
LAW, Annexation Handbook II contained a mind-bending analysis of the statutes in the
annexation law that exempt from, or include within, certain municipalities based on
population (and sometimes other) “brackets.” Many of those brackets were eliminated
by Public Acts 2014, Chapter 707, and others probably have limited application after the
passage of Public Acts 1998, Chapter 1101. In addition, many remaining ones may still
be constitutionally suspect. But they remain part of Tennessee’s annexation law, and
any municipality considering annexation should determine whether any of them are a
potential annexation impediment.
CHAPTER 8, ANNEXATION AND PLAN OF SERVICES PUBLIC NOTICE AND
HEARING ISSUES, considers the statutory hearing requirements that apply to both
those instruments. Under Tennessee annexation case law it appears clear that defects
in hearing requirements must be challenged in a quo warranto proceedings and that
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persons making such challenges have only a narrow time frame to make a complaint on
those grounds. However, most hearing defects can be avoided by the use of a calendar
and common sense by the annexing municipality.
CHAPTER 9, “PROBLEM” ANNEXATIONS, as its title implies, discusses categories of
annexations that stand out as particularly troublesome in Tennessee. Those categories
include corridor annexations, and annexation by acquiescence. It also points to donut
hole annexations as a potential problem. This chapter will also reiterate the important
distinction between quo warranto challenges to annexations and those brought under
the Declaratory Judgments Act, and the extremely limited application of the latter
procedure to most annexation cases.
CHAPTER 10, EFFECT OF ANNEXATION ON OTHER GOVERNMENTS, outlines the
statutes and cases governing the rights of annexing municipalities to provide service in
the annexed territory, and the limitations under federal and state law limiting that right,
particularly with respect to certain utility services.
CHAPTER 11, “DEANNEXATION” AND OTHER BOUNDARY ADJUSTMENTS, deals
with the laws governing how municipalities “deannex” territory and make boundary
adjustments by contract. It also discusses municipal mergers.
Footnotes and Case and Statutory References
Footnotes are used sparingly in this publication, and infra and supra and other esoteric
references to cases and statutes not at all. This publication is designed to put statutory
and case citations at the fingertips of the reader without him or her being required to
travel forward and backward through it.
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CHAPTER 2
RECENT SIGNIFICANT STATUTORY CHANGES IN
TENNESSEE’S ANNEXATION LAW
Countywide Comprehensive Growth Plan
Public Acts 1998, Chapter 1101, codified in T.C.A. § 6-58-101 et seq., as amended,
provides for a comprehensive growth policy plan in each county that is, in theory,
supposed to guide and direct new development in the county during the next 20 years.
But it is probably accurate to say that in most counties the critical issue in the formation
of the comprehensive growth plan was where municipalities could—and could not—
annex territory during that period.
In each county a coordinating committee whose members included representatives from
the county, cities, utilities, schools, chambers of commerce, soil conservation districts,
and other entities formulated the initial draft of the growth plan. The county and the
cities in the county proposed boundaries for inclusion in the plan. After the growth plan
was developed, the committee conducted public hearings and submitted the plan to the
county and city governments for ratification. The committee could revise the plan upon
objection from any one of these local governments. If the governmental entities could
not agree on a plan, any one of them could petition the Tennessee secretary of state to
appoint a dispute resolution panel of administrative law judges to settle the conflict.
Once adopted by the July 1, 2001, deadline, a plan could not be amended for three
years except in extraordinary circumstances. All counties have adopted a growth plan
as required by Chapter 1101.
The countywide growth plan identifies three distinct areas in the county:




Urban Growth Boundaries (UGB)—areas that contain the corporate limits of a
municipality and the adjoining territory where growth is expected;
Planned Growth Areas—areas outside incorporated municipalities where growth
is expected and where new incorporations may occur; and
Rural Areas—territory not within one of the other two categories that is to be
preserved for agriculture, recreation, forest, wildlife, and uses other than highdensity commercial or residential development. T.C.A. § 6-58-101.

The three-year period during which growth plans could not be amended except in
extraordinary circumstances has passed, and growth plan amendment activity has
occurred in some counties and will likely occur in others. The amendment of
comprehensive growth plans is accomplished in the same way the original
comprehensive growth plans were adopted. A detailed explanation of that process is
found in Amending Comprehensive Growth Plans, 2005 (see Appendix B), a joint
CTAS-MTAS publication by David Connor and Dennis Huffer.
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In addition, it is said in City of Harriman v. Roane County Election Commission, 384
S.W.3d 685 (Tenn. 2011), that, “When amending a growth plan, the coordinating
committee must follow the same procedures used to establish the original growth plan”
(citing T.C.A. § 6-58-104(d)). [At 697.] In that case, the Tennessee Court of Appeals
had held that in order to annex territory outside its urban growth boundary a municipality
need only “propose” – but not obtain – an amendment to the growth plan adopted by the
county (citing T.C.A. § 6-58-111(a). The Tennessee Supreme Court overturned the
Court of Appeals, applying the rules of statutory construction to reason that it was the
intention of the General Assembly that changes in the urban growth boundary require
the approval of a reconvened coordinating committee as prescribed by the Growth Plan
Law. “[O]nly after the amendment procedure may a municipality annex the subject
territory by ordinance.” (alternatively, at that time, by referendum). [At 690-691.]
Other Restrictions on Annexation
Chapter 1101 also imposed some serious restrictions on annexation. Sections 19 and
21 increased plans of service requirements on the part of cities annexing territory.
Under § 24, certain tax revenues generated in annexed territories may go to the county
for long periods. Section 13 of that act also restricts the incorporation of new cities to
territory designated in the county growth plan as planned growth areas and requires the
approval of the county governing body before an incorporation election can be held. It
also imposes certain tax consequences and other limitations on such incorporations that
in some cases will be a deterrent to new incorporations on the fringes of existing cities.
Amendments to Comprehensive Growth Plan Law
The General Assembly has amended the Comprehensive Growth Plan Law contained in
T.C.A., Title 6, Chapter 8 several times. An amendment to it by Public Acts 2014,
Chapter 707, § 6, provides that “A municipality may expand its urban growth boundary
to annex a tract of land without reconvening the coordinating committee or
approval from the county or any other municipality, if:
(1)
(2)
(3)

The tract is contiguous to a tract of land that has the same owner
and has already been annexed by the municipality;
The tract is being provided water and sewer services; and
The owner of the tract, by notarized petition, consents to being
included within the urban growth boundaries of the municipality.

Other Restrictions on Annexation By Public Acts 2014, Chapter 7071
The same act severely restricted the methods of annexation, at least in the short term.
Under § 1, the following restrictions on annexation by ordinance and by referendum
apply:
 From April 15, 2013 through the effective date of the act (April 14, 2014), (a
period that has passed) no municipalities can annex land used primarily for
1

See Appendix C, which is a copy of Public Acts 2014, Chapter 707.
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residential or agricultural purposes on its own initiative. But if the ordinance does
not take effect by April 14, 2014 and if the municipality would “suffer substantial
and demonstrable financial injury” if the ordinance does not become operable
before that date, the county legislative body, upon a petition filed by the
municipality by that date, may by a majority vote of its membership, waive the
restrictions imposed on the ordinance by subdivision(a)(1)(A). [Subsection
(a)(1)(A) and (B).]


From April 15, 2014 through May 15, 2015, municipalities are entirely prohibited
from extending their corporate limits by annexation by ordinance and by
referendum, except if:
o The owner or owners of the property give written consent for the
annexation; or
o The municipal legislative body shows it “suffers substantial and
demonstrable financial injury” if the ordinance or resolution does
not become effective on that date and the county legislative body
waives the restrictions prescribed above; or
o The annexation meets the requirements of § 6 of the act, which are
contained above. [Subsection (a)(2)(A) and (B).]



Section 2(a) of the act, amends T.C.A., § 6-51-102 (annexation by ordinance), by
deleting subsections (a), (c), and (d). Subsection (2)(b) declares that
“Subsection (a) of this section prohibits any annexation by ordinance that is not
both operative and effective prior to May 15, 2015. Subsection (b), which was
not repealed, governs the requirement and outline of a plan of services for both
annexation by ordinance and annexation by referendum.



Section 4 added language to T.C.A., § 6-51-104(a) (annexation by referendum)
which prohibits annexation by referendum of property being used primarily for
agricultural purposes, and provides that such property “shall be annexed only
with the written consent of the property owner or owners [and] shall not require a
referendum.”



Section 5 of the act amended T.C.A. Title 6, Chapter 51, Part 1, by providing that
“any county with a metropolitan form of government may expand its urban
services district” by any method authorized by its charter, including any method,
identified by charter reference to the general annexation law, that was applicable
at the time the charter amendment was approved by referendum under Article XI,
§ 9, of the Tennessee Constitution and T.C.A., § 7-2-106(c) or § 7-2-108(a) (20).
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CHAPTER 3
TAX AND REVENUE IMPLICATIONS OF ANNEXATION
AS OF 2014
COUNTY ENTITLEMENT TO ANNEXATION DATE REVENUE
Entitlement Lasts 15 Years
When a city annexes territory, the county is “held harmless” for 15 years for the loss of
certain tax revenues that the county was receiving from the territory on the date of its
annexation:




Local option sales taxes authorized by T.C.A. § 67-6-702;
Wholesale beer taxes authorized by T.C.A. § 57-3-103; and
Income tax on dividends authorized by T.C.A. § 67-2-102 (Hall income tax).
[T.C.A. § 6-51-115.]

“Annexation date revenue” continues to go to the county for 15 years after the
date of the annexation. The annexing municipality retains any increases in these
revenues generated in the annexed area. (Note that this does not affect the distribution
of the first half of the local option sales tax, which continues to go to education funding.)
If commercial activity in the annexed area decreases due to business closures or
relocations, a city may petition the Department of Revenue to adjust the payments it
makes to the county. T.C.A. § 6-51-115.
Calculating “Annexation Date Revenues”
Any business annexed into a city that produced either local option sales tax revenue or
wholesale beer tax revenue is subject to the hold harmless provision for counties.
Generally, the county is guaranteed the amount of taxes received in the 12 most recent
months prior to the effective date of the annexation, which is termed the “annexation
date revenue.” The method of calculation varies, depending on how long the business
has been paying these taxes.






If the business paid taxes for the full 12 months preceding the annexation
date, then the hold harmless figure is the 12-month total.
If the business was operating for at least one month but less than 12
months preceding the annexation date, the county is due 12 times the
average monthly revenue for the months the business operated.
If the business operated for less than one month before, or started
operations within three months after the annexation date, the county is
due 12 times the average of the first three full months that the business
operated.
With both wholesale beer taxes and local option sales taxes, the county is
entitled to this annual amount for 15 years following an annexation. This
2014 Municipal Technical Advisory Service -- 11

means that for the first 15 years, the city will receive only the tax receipts
from the annexed businesses that exceed the county’s hold harmless
payment, the “annexation date revenue.”
When the amount of the local option sales tax cannot be determined from the sales tax
returns filed by the businesses in the annexed area, the Tennessee Department of
Revenue may determine the amount to be distributed for the term of 15 years based on
the best information available, including information from business tax returns or
additional information from the businesses involved. T.C.A. § 6-51-115(b)(3).
To facilitate the proper distribution of the local option sales tax, the city is required to
notify the state Department of Revenue in advance of the effective date of any
annexation. T.C.A. § 6-51-115(a)(2).
The county is responsible for reporting a list of taxpaying businesses in the annexed
area to the Department of Revenue. T.C.A. § 6-51-115(d)(1).
The city is responsible for collecting and distributing the wholesale beer tax from
businesses in the annexed area, which is collected directly by the city from beer
distributors. The city is required to remit the proper amount to the county annually.
Effective July 1 on distribution of situs based taxes, T.C.A. § 6-51-115(a), provides:
Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, except
whenever a municipality extends its boundaries by
annexation, the county or counties in which the municipality
is located shall continue to receive the revenue from all state
and local taxes distributed on the bases of situs of collection,
generated within the annexed area, until July 1 following the
annexation unless the annexation takes effect on July 1.
T.C.A. § 6-51-115(a)(1) provides that if the annexation takes effect on July 1, the
municipality shall begin receiving revenues from such taxes generated in the annexed
area for the period beginning July 1.
January 1 Tax Date Impact On Annexation Timing
The timing of annexation is important. An annexation ordinance becomes operational 30
days after its final passage in the absence of a lawsuit challenging the annexation. An
annexation by referendum becomes effective 30 days after certification of the election
results.
Two dates should be kept in mind in planning the effective date of an annexation
ordinance or referendum, taking into account the 30-day waiting period:
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1. January 1 is the assessment date for property to be placed on the tax rolls,
and June 30 is the deadline for qualifying for state shared taxes in the
ensuing fiscal year.
2. The deadline for certifying a special census is June 30. Time must be allowed
for taking, holding, and certifying that census. Failure to meet this deadline
will result in the loss of state shared taxes for the added residents for an
entire year.
A city can influence the property tax impact on an annexation by scheduling it before or
after the assessment date of January 1. Before that date, property taxes for that year
will be payable by property owners in the annexed areas; after that date, property
owners will not be liable for the property tax until the following year. If a lawsuit against
an annexation occurs or is expected, the timing of the effective date of the annexation
may be less significant. Such lawsuits are often characterized by many delays, which
make that date unpredictable. But in some cases, the city’s agreement to a delay in the
effective date of the annexation with its corresponding delay in when property taxes
become due in the annexed property might be helpful in settling the lawsuit in the city’s
favor.
With respect to annexation by ordinance, cities apparently have the authority to fix the
“operative” or effective date of an annexation in the ordinance. In Bastnagel v.
Memphis, 457 S.W.2d 532 (1970), on October 28, 1968, the City of Memphis adopted
an annexation ordinance on final reading. The ordinance fixed the day the annexation
would actually take place as December 31, 1969. On December 15, 1969, the plaintiff
filed a suit challenging the reasonableness of the annexation. He argued that the
“operative” date of the annexation under T.C.A. § 6-309-310 [now T.C.A. § 6-51-102103] was December 31, 1969, and that he had 30 days before the operative date to
challenge the ordinance. The city argued that the “operative” date of the annexation
under those statutes was 30 days after the final passage of the ordinance on October
28, 1968. The court agreed with the city, holding that the challenge to the annexation
had not been made within 30 days following October 28, 1968.
SPECIAL CENSUS AND STATE SHARED TAXES
Special Census After Annexation
In the event any area is annexed to any municipality, the municipality may have a
special census and in any county having a population of not less than 276,000 nor more
than 277,000 according to the 1970 or any subsequent federal census, the municipality
shall have such special census within the annexed area taken by the Federal Bureau of
the Census or in a manner directed by and satisfactory to the Tennessee Department of
Economic and Community Development, in which case the population of such
municipality shall be changed and revised so as to include the population of the
annexed area as shown by the supplemental census. The population of the municipality
as so changed and revised shall be its population for the purpose of computing the
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municipality’s share of all funds and monies distributed by the state of Tennessee
among the municipalities of the state on a population basis. The population of the
municipality as so revised shall be used to compute the aggregate population of
all municipalities of the state, effective on the first day of the next July following the
certification of the supplemental census results to the commissioner of finance and
administration. T.C.A. § 6-51-114.
State Shared Taxes
The deadline of June 30 to certify a special census of an annexed area in order to
secure state shared taxes during the ensuing fiscal year (July 1 to June 30) has already
been mentioned. After an annexation is finally effective, a city should make certain that
certification is made on time. If time is short, the census could be taken before the final
effective date so that the results will be available for certification immediately thereafter.
Two agencies can certify a special census: the Federal Bureau of the Census and the
Tennessee Department of Economic and Community Development. The former will
assume full responsibility for supervising and conducting the census, but the request
usually must be submitted well in advance of the desired completion date. Full
information and an estimate of costs must be obtained from the Director of the Census,
Department of Commerce, Washington, DC 20333. Upon completion, the city should
make certain that a copy of the results is sent to the Tennessee Department of
Economic and Community Development. The census done by the Tennessee
Department of Economic and Community Development is required to be done in a
“manner directed by and satisfactory to” that department.
Instructions and an estimate of costs may be obtained from the Tennessee Department
of Economic and Community Development, 312 Eighth Avenue North, 10th Floor,
Nashville, Tennessee 37243.
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CHAPTER 4
ANNEXATION BY REFERENDUM1
ANNEXATION BY REFERENDUM BY CITY WITHIN ITS UGB
Generally
Cities are entitled to annex by referendum under T.C.A. §§ 6-51-104 and 105.
The referendum process begins when a petition of interested persons is presented to
the city council, or when the council on its own initiative decides to proceed without a
petition. A resolution is prepared and adopted by the city governing body that defines
the area to be annexed and calls for a referendum.
NOTICE AND PUBLIC HEARING ON ANNEXATION AND PLAN OF SERVICES
REQUIRED
T.C.A. § 6-51-104(a) and (b) contain stringent public notice requirements on both the
annexation and the plan of services:


A copy of the annexation resolution describing the territory proposed for
annexation “shall be promptly sent by the municipality to the last known
address listed in the office of the property assessor for each property
owner of record within the territory proposed for annexation.”



Resolution to be sent by first class mail and be mailed no later than 14
days prior to the scheduled date of the hearing on the proposed
annexation.



A person or persons with personal knowledge of the mailing of resolutions
to each property owner of record “may” submit a notarized affidavit to the
presiding officer of the municipality that such resolutions were mailed.
The failure of a property owner to receive the mailed notice shall not be
grounds to invalidate the annexation.



Resolution shall be published by posting copies of it in at least 3 public
places in the territory to be annexed and in a like number of public places
in the annexing municipality.



Resolution shall include a plan of services that “shall” address the same
services and timing of services as required by T.C.A., § 6-51-102, as
follows:

1

For sample resolutions or ordinances for a call for a referendum on annexation, and resolutions adopting
plans of services, see Appendix D.
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o Shall include but not be limited to police protection, water
service, electrical service, sanitary sewer service, solid
waste collection, road and street construction and repair,
recreational facilities and programs, street lighting, and
zoning services, and if the annexing municipality owns a
separate school system, the plan shall include schools and
provisions specifically addressing the impacts, if any, of
annexation on school attendance zones.
o Reasonable implementation schedule for the delivery of
comparable services with respect to the services delivered to
all citizens of the municipality.


Notice of the time, place and purpose of the public hearing on the plan of
services shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the
municipality not less than 15 days before the hearing.



Notice of the public hearing on plan of services must include the location
of a minimum of 3 copies of the plan of services, which the municipality
shall provide for public inspection during all business hours from the date
of the notice until the public hearing.

The adopted resolution then must be posted in at least three public places in the
proposed annexed area and in three places in the existing city, and it must “at about the
same time” be published in the local newspaper of general circulation (if there is one) in
both the territory proposed for annexation and in the city.
Between 30 and 60 days after the resolution’s posting and publication, a referendum of
the voters who live in the area proposed for annexation is held by the county election
commission. At its own option, the city may also have the referendum include all voters
within the existing city.
If the referendum receives a majority vote of the residents of the proposed area or, if
submitted to the city’s voters a majority of those votes as well, the annexation is
approved and takes effect 30 days after the election commission certifies the results.
Under Public Acts 2014, Chapter 707, §1(a)(2)(A) a municipality cannot annex territory
by either referendum or by ordinance between April 15, 2014 through April 15, 2015.
ANNEXED TERRITORY MUST BE CONTIGUOUS TO EXISTING CITY
Tennessee’s annexation law does not mention the word “contiguous.” Tennessee Code
Annotated, § 6-51-102, speaking of annexation by ordinance, says: “A
municipality…may extend its corporate limits by annexation of such territory adjoining its
existing boundaries….” Tennessee Code Annotated, § 6-51-104, speaking of
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annexation by referendum, says, “A municipality…may propose extension of its
corporate limits by annexation of territory adjoining to its existing boundaries.” But
Town of Bartlett v. City of Memphis, 482 S.W.2d 782, and State ex rel. Maury County
Farmers Co-Op Corp. v. City of Columbia, 362 S.W.2d 210 (1962), declare that the
annexed territory must be “contiguous,” which points to the proposition that contiguity is
achieved only if the annexed territory adjoins the existing municipality.
How strictly the Tennessee courts interpret the requirement that annexed territory
“adjoin” the existing city is seen in Southwest Tennessee Electrical Membership
Corporation v. City of Jackson, 359 S.W.3d 590 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010), and unreported
Garrett v. City of Norris, 2014 WL 4260848 (Tenn. Ct. App.) In the former, it was held
that of pieces of property that were contiguous to each other and annexed at the same
time, only those pieces of property that were contiguous to the existing city at the time
of the annexation were validly annexed. In the latter, the court held that where two
pieces of property were contiguous to each other, but the city annexed one piece of
property that was contiguous to the city, and several hours later annexed the second
piece, the first piece of property was not contiguous to the city at the time it annexed the
second piece, the first annexation ordinance not having become “operative.”
With one exception, Tennessee annexation case law takes up the question of whether
an annexation is contiguous only in cases of annexation by ordinance. The exception is
Smith v. Town of Church Hill, 828 S.W.2d 385 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). There the court
observed that:
The Smiths do not challenge the constitutionality of T.C.A.
§ 6-51-104 or § 6-51-105 (which govern annexation by
referendum) under which their property was annexed, nor do
they contend that the Town did not properly follow the
statutes in the annexation proceedings. Their sole
contention relates to a small area where the portion of the
Smith farm which was annexed in 1986 borders on the west
bank of the Holston River. Even though the 126 acres of the
Smith farm which was taken into the Town in 1986 border on
and are contiguous with the subdivision together with the
remaining portion of the Smith Farm, the Smiths contend this
creates a corridor annexation.
But the court determined that:
A map of the annexed territory shows it begins at the
corporate limits along the north end of the subdivision near
the western bank of the Holston River; thence in an easterly
direction crossing the Holston River to its east bank; thence
with the meanderings of the east bank of the river in a
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southeasterly and a northwesterly direction some 16,600
feet; thence crossing the river to the Town corporate limits;
encompassing some 1,096 acres all of which has as its inner
boundary line the corporate boundary line of the Town and
as its outer boundary line the east bank of the Holston River.
All of the property is within one mile of the Town hall. [At
386.]
The court concluded that the annexed territory was contiguous to the city, made so by
the connection of the subdivision and the farm by the river bed.
ANNEXATION BY ORDINANCE AND BY REFERENDUM RESTRAINED WITHOUT
CONSENT OF PROPERTY OWNERS
Public Acts 2014, Chapter 707 put at least temporary hard brakes on annexation by
ordinance and annexation by referendum in Tennessee. Section 1, subsection (a)(2)(A)
of that act says:
From the effective date of § 1 of this act (April 15, 2014)
through May 15, 2015, no municipality shall extend its
corporate limits by means of annexation by ordinance
pursuant to § 6-51-102, or by resolution [referendum],
pursuant to § 6-51-104 and 6-51-105; and no annexation
shall become operative during such period, unless otherwise
permitted pursuant to subsection (a)(1)(B), (a)(2)(B), or § 6,
or unless the owner or owners of the property give written
consent for the annexation.
That subsection provides two additional narrow methods for annexation by ordinance
and referendum:


Subsection (a)(2)(B) provides a narrow loophole for annexations by ordinance
and by referendum begun prior to the period May 15, 2014 through May 15,
2015, as follows:
o If prior to the effective date of § 1 of this act (April 15, 2014), a
municipality formally acted upon an annexation ordinance or
resolution [referendum] restricted by subdivision (a)(2)(A); and if the
municipality would suffer substantial and demonstrable financial
injury if such ordinance or resolution does not become operative
prior to May 15, 2015; then, upon petition by the municipality
submitted prior to May 15, 2015, the county legislative body may,
by a majority vote of its membership waive the restrictions imposed
on such ordinance or resolution by subsection (a)(2)(A).
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o Section 6 is probably an even narrower loophole for annexations by
ordinance or by referendum. It amends T.C.A., Title 6, Chapter 58
(the Comprehensive Growth Plan Law), which was a product of
Public Acts 1998, Chapter 1101, as amended, by adding this new
section:
A municipality may extend its urban growth boundaries to
annex a tract of land without reconvening the coordinating
committee or approval from the county or any other
municipality if:
(1) The tract is contiguous to a tract of land that has the
same owner and has already been annexed by the
municipality;
(2) The tract is being provided water and sewer services;
and
(3) The owner of the tract, by notarized petition consents to
being included within the urban growth boundaries of the
municipality.
Section 6 appears to apply only to the expansion of the urban growth boundary of a
municipality. The purpose of the notarized petition signed by the owner of the tract is
that he or she “consents to being included within the urban growth boundaries of the
municipality.” Consenting to coming within the urban growth boundary of a municipality
is not the same as being annexed into the municipality. But that section clearly
contemplates an annexation of the qualifying tract of land after the expansion of the
urban growth boundary will legally accommodate it. It may be wise for a property owner
desiring to be annexed to also give his written consent to the annexation.
Section 4 provides that:
No such resolution [for annexation by referendum] shall
propose annexation of any property being used primarily for
agricultural purposes…[Such property shall be annexed only
with the written consent of the property owner or owners.] A
resolution to effectuate annexation of any property, with
written consent of the property owner or owners, shall not
require a referendum.
Annexation by ordinance and by referendum appear to be restrained, at least through
May 15, 2015, by Public Acts 2014, Chapter 707, section 1(a)(2)(A), which provides
that:
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…no municipality shall extend its corporate limits by means
of annexation by ordinance, pursuant to § 6-51-102, or by
referendum, pursuant to §§ 6-51-104 and 6-51-105; and no
annexation shall become operative during such period
unless otherwise permitted pursuant to subsection (a)(1)(B),
(a)(2)(B), or § 6, or unless the owner or owners of property
have given written consent to the annexation. However, no
such resolution shall propose annexation of any property
being used primarily for agricultural purposes…property
being used [for that purpose] shall be annexed only with the
written consent of the property owner or owners.” A
resolution to effectuate annexation of any property with the
written consent of the property owners, shall not require a
referendum.”
The last clause of § 4 may have shifted gears from only agricultural property to all
property that could otherwise be annexed by referendum.
NOTICE REQUIREMENTS
Public Notice Before Annexation
Notice of the annexation, which describes the property to be annexed, must be given in
the case of annexation by ordinance and by referendum. T.C.A. § 6-51-101, provides
that:
“Notice” means publication in a newspaper of general
circulation in the municipality at least seven (7) days in
advance of hearing. The notice, whether by ordinance as
stipulated in § 6-51-102(a)(1) and (b) or by referendum as
stipulated in § 6-51-104(b), shall be satisfied by inclusion of
a map which includes a general delineation of the area or
areas to be annexed by use of official road names and/or
numbers, names of lakes and waterways, or other
identifiable landmarks, as appropriate.
The detailed form of the notice of the resolution for annexation by referendum is
prescribed by T.C.A. § 6-51-104(a) which is outlined by this Chapter, Notice and Public
Hearing Required, above.
The same statute also provides that the resolution [calling for an annexation
referendum] that describes the territory proposed to be annexed shall be published in:



Three public places in the territory proposed for annexation;
Three public places in the city proposing the annexation; and
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A newspaper of general circulation (if there is one) in the territory proposed for
annexation and in the city proposing the annexation.

It also provides that the notice must include a plan of services, which “shall address the
same services and timing of services as required in T.C.A. § 6-51-101, subsection (b)"
[which contains the requirements for the content of the plan of services in annexations
by ordinance]. [See Chapter 6, Plan of Services.]
Notice to County Mayor of Annexation Resolution
T.C.A. § 6-51-104 requires that the resolution calling for an annexation referendum
[which includes the plan of services] be forwarded to the county mayor in whose county
the territory being annexed is located. The county mayor is required to notify the
appropriate county department of the information the resolution contains.
Notice to County Mayor of Annexation Certification
T.C.A. § 6-51-105(d) [annexation by referendum] requires the municipality, upon
receiving the certification from the election commission, to forward a copy of the
certification to the county mayor in whose county the territory being annexed is located.
Notice to Emergency Communications Districts
T.C.A. § 6-51-119(a) requires that the legislative body of the annexing municipality,
upon the final passage of an annexation ordinance, provide to any affected emergency
communications district a copy of the portion of the plan of services dealing with
emergency services and a detailed map designating the annexed area, which must
contain certain information. In the case of a contested annexation ordinance where the
city plans to begin providing emergency services in the annexed territory immediately,
the municipality must notify the emergency communications district when the
annexation becomes final.
Arguably, this notice provision does not apply to annexation by referendum. However, it
would be a legally and practically wise policy for any municipality annexing territory by
referendum to comply with this notice provision.
Effect of Failure to Notify Emergency Communications Districts
T.C.A. § 6-51-119 provides that compliance or noncompliance with this provision is not
admissible against the municipality in any case brought under T.C.A., Title 6
[presumably Chapter 51, which governs annexation and challenges to annexation], Title
29, Chapter 14 [the Declaratory Judgments Act, under which challenges against
annexations upon grounds other than the reasonableness of the annexation would be
brought], or against the municipality or any affected emergency communications district
under T.C.A., Title 29, Chapter 20 [the Tennessee Tort Liability Act].
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Notice to County Election Commission/s
T.C.A. § 2-2-107 requires that in order to timely correct voter registration records,
municipalities that have annexed territory shall send to the county election commission
or commissions affected by an annexation:




Maps depicting the area annexed;
Copy of the annexation ordinance (or resolution), denoting, if applicable, which
wards or districts the annexed area will be a part of; and
A copy of the census taken for the annexation, if available, with names and
addresses within the annexed area.

NOTICE TO SCHOOL SYSTEMS
If the municipality does not maintain a separate school system, the municipality must
provide written notice of the annexation to all affected school systems as soon as
practicable, but in no event, not less than 30 days prior to the public hearing which must
be the same as the public hearing on the annexation.
PLAN OF SERVICE REQUIRED
T.C.A. § 6-51-102(b)(1), requires that the governing body of the annexing municipality
to adopt a plan of services for the territory to be annexed by referendum. [See detailed
notice and public hearing, as well as contents of plan of service requirements, in Notice
and Public Hearing Requirements above.]
T.C.A. § 6-51-104 requires the annexation resolution [which must include the plan of
services] to be sent to the county mayor before the annexation. [See Chapter 6, Plan of
Services.]
CHALLENGING ANNEXATIONS BY REFERENDUM
Annexations by ordinance were subject to challenge by quo warranto, and in rare cases
by declaratory judgment. However, Tennessee’s annexation law makes no provision for
court review of an annexation accomplished by referendum. It is said in Vicars v.
Kingsport, 659 S.W.2d 367 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983), that absent some claim of
constitutional infirmities in the annexation, it is not subject to judicial review and that no
equal protection or due process argument can be made when the statute is properly
followed. The court also said that adjusting the boundaries of the territory proposed for
annexation to help the annexation receive a favorable vote in the referendum was not a
constitutional infirmity.
However, the Tennessee Supreme Court in Committee To Oppose Annexation v. City of
Alcoa, 881 S.W.2d 269 (Tenn. 1994), limited the extent to which a city could adjust the
boundaries of the territory to help ensure a favorable vote in the annexation referendum.
Under T.C.A. § 6-51-104(a) the “qualified voters who reside in the territory proposed for
annexation” are entitled to vote in the referendum. The court held that “residency” within
the meaning of that statute was not restricted to those whose dwelling houses were
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located on the property proposed for annexation but to those whose curtilage extended
into that property. The difference was an undetermined, but undoubtedly significant,
number of voters qualified to vote in the referendum. The court did not mention what
constitutional entitlements might be involved in the denial of the property owners who
resided in the proposed annexation area to vote on the annexation. But the court
concluded they were “disenfranchised” under the state’s electoral laws.
But challenges to annexations by referendum that do not comply with the law governing
such annexations may be subject to challenge under the Declaratory Judgments Act for
being ultra vires under the reasoning of Highwoods Properties, Inc. v. City of Memphis,
297 S.W.3d 695 (Tenn. 2009). That case analyzed annexation by ordinance and
cleared up the question of when they could be challenged under the Declaratory
Judgment Act as opposed to quo warranto actions. But language in that case may be
broad enough to encompass annexations by referendum that do not follow the state law
governing such annexations. [See Chapter 10, Problem Annexations.]
Note that in Smith v. Town of Church Hill, 828 S.W.2d 385 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991) the
court observed that the plaintiffs did not allege any constitutional or state law violations
in the annexation at issue. [See this chapter, Annexed Territory must be Contiguous to
Existing City.]
ANNEXATION BY REFERENDUM OUTSIDE THE CITY’S UGB
Generally Prohibited
Before January 1, 2006, a city could annex territory outside its UGB in either of two
ways:



By obtaining approval of an amendment to its UGB in the same way that
the original growth plan was established; or
By referendum under T.C.A. §§ 6-51-104 and 105. T.C.A. § 6-51-111(d).

T.C.A. § 6-58-111(c)(2) gives municipalities the exclusive authority to annex territory
within their UGBs, but provides that “a municipality may annex within a county’s planned
growth area or rural area, but the annexation must be by referendum only and not by
ordinance.”
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CHAPTER 5
ANNEXATION BY ORDINANCE1
THE TWILIGHT OF ANNEXATION BY ORDINANCE
One Tennessee court recently observed that, “Annexation by ordinance is in its twilight.”
Unreported Garrett v. City of Norris, 2014 WL 4260848 (Tenn. Ct. App). [At 5.] That is
likely a correct observation. If that is so, much, if not most, of this chapter, and other
provisions in Annexation Handbook III dealing with annexation by ordinance, may soon
be obsolete. However, because some annexation by ordinance activity is still ongoing
and because there may be challenges to any annexation ordinances resulting from that
activity, some of these provisions may still be temporarily useful. In all events, much of
the law that formerly applied only to annexations by ordinance also applies to
annexation by referendum.
ANNEXED TERRITORY MUST BE CONTIGUOUS TO EXISTING CITY
Tennessee’s annexation law does not mention the word “contiguous.” Tennessee Code
Annotated, § 6-51-102, speaking of annexation by ordinance, says: “A
municipality…may extend its corporate limits by annexation of such territory adjoining its
existing boundaries….” Tennessee Code Annotated, § 6-51-104, speaking of
annexation by referendum, says, “A municipality…may propose extension of its
corporate limits by annexation of territory adjoining to its existing boundaries.” But
Town of Bartlett v. City of Memphis, 482 S.W.2d 782 (1972), and State ex rel. Maury
County Farmers Co-Op Corp. v. City of Columbia, 362 S.W.2d 210 (1962), declare that
the annexed territory must be “contiguous,” which points to the proposition that
contiguity is achieved only if the annexed territory adjoins the existing municipality.
How strictly the Tennessee courts interpret the requirement that annexed territory
“adjoin” the existing city is seen in Southwest Tennessee Electrical Membership
Corporation v. City of Jackson, 359 S.W.3d 590 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010), and unreported
Garrett v. City of Norris, 2014 WL 4260848 (Tenn. Ct. App.) In the former, it was held
that of pieces of property that were contiguous to each other and annexed at the same
time, only those pieces of property that were contiguous to the existing city at the time
of the annexation were validly annexed. In the latter, the court held that where two
pieces of property were contiguous to each other, but the city annexed one piece of
property that was contiguous to the city, and several hours later annexed the second
piece, the first piece of property was not contiguous to the city at the time it annexed the
second piece, the first annexation ordinance not having become “operative.”

1

For sample annexation ordinances and plans of services, see Appendix E.
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NOTICE REQUIREMENTS
Pre-Annexation Public Notice
Notice of the annexation, which describes the property to be annexed, must be given in
the case of annexation by ordinance [and by referendum]. T.C.A. § 6-51-101, provides
that:
“Notice” means publication in a newspaper of general
circulation in the municipality at least seven (7) days in
advance of hearing. The notice, whether by ordinance as
stipulated in § 6-51-102(a)(1) and (b) or by referendum as
stipulated in § 6-51-104(b), shall be satisfied by inclusion of
a map which includes a general delineation of the area or
areas to be annexed by use of official road names and/or
numbers, names of lakes and waterways, or other
identifiable landmarks, as appropriate.
Notice to County Mayor of Annexation
T.C.A. § 6-51-102(a)(1) provides that during the 30-day period following final passage of
the annexation ordinance during which the ordinance is not operative, the municipality
must notify the county mayor in whose county the territory being annexed is located of
the annexation. The notification must include a copy of the annexation ordinance and a
map of the area being annexed.
Notice to Emergency Communications Districts
T.C.A. § 6-51-119(a) requires that upon the final passage of an annexation ordinance
the legislative body of the annexing municipality must provide to any affected
emergency communications district a copy of the portion of the plan of services dealing
with emergency services and a detailed map designating the annexed area. The map
must identify all public and private streets, including street names and direction
indicators, in the annexed area. The map must also include or have appended a list of
address ranges for each street in the annexed area. For contested annexation
ordinances, in cases in which the municipality plans to begin providing emergency
services in the annexed territory immediately, the municipality must notify the
emergency communications district when the annexation becomes final.
However, T.C.A. § 6-51-119, provides that compliance or noncompliance with this
provision is not admissible against the municipality in any case brought under T.C.A.
Title 6 [presumably Chapter 51, which governs annexation and challenges to
annexation], Title 29, Chapter 14 [the Declaratory Judgments Act, under which
challenges against annexations upon grounds other than the reasonableness of the
annexation would be brought], or against the municipality or any affected emergency
communications district under T.C.A., Title 29, Chapter 20 [the Tennessee Tort Liability
Act].
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Notice to County Election Commission/s
T.C.A. § 2-2-107 requires that in order to timely correct voter registration records,
municipalities that have annexed territory shall send to the county election commission
or commissions affected by an annexation:




Maps depicting the area annexed;
Copy of the annexation ordinance, denoting, if applicable, which wards or
districts the annexed area will be a part of; and
A copy of the census taken for the annexation, if available, with names and
addresses within the annexed area.

Notice to County Mayor of Lawsuits and Final Judgments
T.C.A. § 6-51-103 requires the municipality to notify the county mayor of:



The municipality’s appeal of a decision in a quo warranto suit; and
The outcome of litigation in a quo warranto suit contesting a proposed
annexation.

Note that this statute does not require notice to the county mayor of appeals and
outcomes of non-quo warranto annexation suits.
Similar notice provisions apply to the plan of services. [See Chapter 6, Plan of
Services.]
RIGHTS OF CITIZENS IN ANNEXED TERRITORY
Residents of an annexed area must be accorded all the:
Rights and privileges of citizenship, in accordance with the
provisions of the annexing municipality’s charter,
immediately upon annexation as though such annexed
territory had always been a part of the annexing municipality.
It is the duty of the governing body to put into effect with
respect to the annexed area any charter provisions relating
to representation on the governing body. T.C.A. § 6-51108(a).
In City of Knoxville v. Graves, 341 S.W.2d 718 (1960), an annexation ordinance was
attacked because it did not contain any provision for implementing this requirement. The
court could find nothing in the statute to warrant a construction “that the ordinance must
contain, as a condition precedent to its validity, a provision setting up such rights,” and
concluded that “it is enough if the rights of the citizens of that area are provided for by
ordinance, as may be done, when the annexation becomes effective. Certainly we
cannot declare the ordinance void on the assumption that the City Council will not do
their duty. The presumption is that they will do it.” [At 720.] The court reiterated its
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view on this point in Hardison v. City of Columbia, 360 S.W.2d 39 (1962), and Maury
County Farmers Co-op Corp. v. City of Columbia, 362 S.W.2d 219 (1962). In Cope v.
Mayor of Morristown, 404 S.W.2d 798 (1966), the court refused to invalidate an
annexation ordinance based on the ground that the city’s governing body would be
powerless to change wards established by private act of the General Assembly for
election of its members.
ANNEXATION BY ORDINANCE WITHIN THE UGB
Generally
Cities in Tennessee may, upon their own initiative or when petitioned by a majority of
the residents and property owners in an area, annex territory by ordinance within their
UGBs. Passage of an annexation ordinance must be preceded by a seven-day advance
notice of a public hearing. The actual schedule for final passage will depend on the
requirements for preparation and consideration of a plan of services for the annexed
territory that are outlined in Chapter 6, Plan of Services. The ordinance does not take
effect until 30 days after its final passage. T.C.A. § 6-51-102.
Annexation by a City in More Than One County (T.C.A. § 6-58-108(e))
A city may annex by ordinance upon its own initiative only territory within the county in
which the city hall is located. There are three main exceptions:





A municipality located in two or more counties as of November 25, 1997,
may annex in all such counties unless the percentage of the city
population residing in the county or counties other than the one in which
the city hall is located is less than 7 percent of the total population of the
municipality; or
A municipality may annex in the second county if the legislative body of
the county in which the territory proposed for annexation is located
approves the annexation by resolution; or
The city may annex in any county in which, on January 1, 1998, it
provided sanitary sewer service to 100 or more residential and/or
commercial customers.

These restrictions do not apply to annexation by referendum. Any annexation must also
conform to the provisions of the growth plans in both counties.
Annexation of “Substantial” Industrial Property
T.C.A. § 6-51-103(f), provides that:
Should the territory hereafter sought to be annexed be the
site of substantial industrial plant development, a fact to be
ascertained by the court, the municipality shall have the
burden of proving that the annexation of the site...is not
unreasonable in consideration of the factors above
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mentioned, including the necessity for or use of municipal
services by the industrial plant or plants, and the present
ability and intent of the municipality to benefit the industrial
plant development by rendering municipal services thereto
when and as needed. The policy and purpose of this
provision is to prevent the annexation of industrial plants for
the sole purpose of increasing municipal revenue, without
the ability and intent to benefit the areas annexed by
rendering municipal services, when and as needed, and
when such services are not used or required by the industrial
plants.
City of Kingsport v. State ex rel. Crown Enterprises, Inc., 562 S.W.2d 808 (Tenn. 1978),
declared that T.C.A. § 6-51-103(e) applied only when an industrial site was being
annexed by a city; it did not apply to an 85-acre industrial site that was part of the
annexation of 806 acres.
Annexation of State Park Land
T.C.A. Title 6, Chapter 51, Part 1, requires the following as a precedent to municipal
annexation of any state park land:








The territory proposed for annexation must be located within the municipality’s
urban growth boundaries;
The municipality must provide detailed notice to the commissioner of
environment and conservation;
Notification must include a detailed description of the territory proposed for
annexation, reasons for the annexation, plan for municipal services and timeline
for delivery;
The department must study the likely impact on the wildlife, scenery, ambiance,
traffic, roads, visitors and mission of the proposed territory to be annexed.
Municipality must pay the costs of this study;
The department must conduct one or more public hearings;
Prior to the public hearing, the department must seek the county commission’s
input regarding the municipality’s proposed annexation;
The department must report its finding and may prescribe binding prerequisites
for the proposed annexation as are necessary and desirable to protect and
preserve the park or natural area for the benefit of all current and future
Tennesseans.

TRIAL AND BURDEN OF PROOF
Challenges based on “reasonableness” of the annexation ordinance
The following rules govern quo warranto challenges to the reasonableness of
annexations by ordinance within the UGB, under T.C.A. § 6-51-103:
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Jury trial generally: Chancellor or circuit court judge without a jury tries
cases.
Burden of proof generally: Burden is on the plaintiff to prove:
o That the annexation is “...unreasonable for the overall well-being of the
communities involved,” or
o That “the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens and property owners of
the municipality and [the annexed] territory will not be materially retarded
in the absence of such annexation.” T.C.A. § 6-58-111.

Presumably, T.C.A. § 6-58-111, by implication, repeals the provisions of T.C.A. §§ 6-51103(a)(1)(A), 6-51-103(c) and 6-51-103(e), which put the burden of proving an
annexation ordinance reasonable on the city.
The question whether the burdens of proof contained in T.C.A. § 6-58-111 are
alternative ones was addressed in State ex rel. Tipton v. City of Knoxville, 205 S.W.3d
456 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006), appeal by Tenn. Supreme Ct. denied (Oct. 2, 2006). There
the city attempted to annex a single piece of commercial property that was already
surrounded by the city (a hole in the donut). The annexation would have taken in the
hole.
The Tennessee Court of Appeals upheld the city’s annexation of the territory in
question, concluding that the plaintiff had not carried the burden of proof that the
“health, safety, and welfare of the citizens and property owners of the municipality and
territory will not be materially retarded in the absence of such annexation.” It reasoned
that:
1.

2.

3.
4.

The “or” in the alternative burden of proof set forth in T.C.A. § 6-58-111 was
not ambiguous, that it was intended by the General Assembly to actually
reflect alternative burdens of proof, and that a person contesting an
annexation could win the contest by carrying only one of the alternative
burdens of proof.
Whether annexation is materially beneficial to the affected territory depends
not only upon what services the municipality will provide after annexation
but also upon the services the municipality already provides to the affected
territory. The fact that an affected territory already receives municipal
services demonstrates that the affected territory benefits from those
services and that the welfare of the property owners in the affected territory
is enhanced by those services. [Emphasis is mine.] Bowevil Express, LLC
v. City of Henderson, No. W1999-02137-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 204211, at
5 (Tenn. Ct. App.); see also Cox v. City of Jackson, No. 01A01-9701-CH00001, 1997 WL 777078, at 6 (Tenn. Ct. App.) [At 7.]
The territory will receive improved services after the annexation.
“After annexation, the city would be able to guarantee harmonious land uses
throughout the area surrounding the Territory. In addition, the city will be
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able to better respond to emergencies in that area. Based on these facts,
the preponderance of the evidence establishes that the city would materially
benefit from the annexation.”
In summary, said the court:
...the preponderance of the evidence shows that (1) the
Territory currently, materially benefits from services provided
by the City, (2) the Territory would materially benefit from the
additional post-annexation services which the City would
provide, and (3) the City will materially benefit from the
annexation. If the Territory and the City will materially
benefit from the annexation, then it follows that the failure to
annex the Territory would materially retard the health, safety,
and welfare of the citizens and property owners of the City
and Territory. See State ex rel. Wood v. City of Memphis,
510 S.W.2d 889, 893 (Tenn. 1974); Mulrooney v. Town of
Collierville, No. W1999-04474-COA-Re-CV, 2000 WL
34411151, at 3 (Tenn. Ct. App.) [At 9-10.]
The facts in State v. Tipton are peculiar, involving a large Tennessee city entirely
surrounding a small piece of property on a busy highway running through it. But a
positive side of this case is that it stands for the general proposition that where a
municipality already provides a wide range of services to territory proposed for
annexation, the plaintiff will not be able to successfully argue that the health, safety and
welfare of the territory will not be retarded if it is not annexed because it does not need
municipal services. It also points to the proposition that annexations that clearly
materially benefit both the city and the territory proposed for annexation would
strengthen a city’s hand in an annexation contest.
Challenges to the Ordinance Based on Constitutional Grounds
Under State ex rel. Earhart v. City of Bristol, 970 S.W.2d 948 (Tenn. 1998), it appears
that suits alleging an annexation is unconstitutional or ultra vires can be brought under
the Declaratory Judgment Act found in T.C.A. § 29-14-101 et seq., in narrow
circumstances. (See Highwood Properties, Inc., v. City of Memphis, 297 S.W.2d 1095
(Tenn. 2009) and Chapter 10 Problem Annexations.)
It is said in Bristol v. Earhart, above, that:
But where the quo warranto proceeding is not available
alternative equitable remedies are not barred. “[W]here the
remedy by quo warranto is available, it is usually held that
there is no concurrent remedy in equity, unless by virtue of
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statutory provision. But if quo warranto is not an adequate
remedy, it will not be a bar to alternative remedies.” 65 Am
Jur. 2d Quo Warranto § 7 (1972). [At 952.]
The availability of other remedies drew a line around Declaratory Judgment Act suits in
annexation cases. That case pointed to two conditions that it had imposed on such
suits:
First, we permitted only challenges to ultra vires acts, that is,
tests of “[t]he validity of an annexation ordinance alleged to
exceed the authority delegated by the legislature.” Earhart,
970 S.E.2d at 954. Second, we stated that it is only “where
the quo warranto proceedings is not available, [that]
alternative equitable remedies are not barred.” Id. At 952
(citing 65 Am.Jur.2d Quo Warranto § 7 (1972)) (“Where the
remedy by quo warranto is available, it is usually held that
there is no concurrent remedy in equity, unless by virtue of
statutory provision.”) [Emphasis added (by court).] [At 10.]
Highwoods emphasized that Bristol v. Earhart involved a case where the absence of
people in the annexed area meant that there could be no plaintiffs: No plaintiffs, no
case, no case, no remedies for an ultra vires annexation.
In Allen v. City of Memphis, 397 S.W.3d 572 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012), which involved an
action for a declaratory judgment, based on open meetings violations, the court citing
Bristol and Highwoods, declared that:
[T]he specific deficiencies alleged by Appellants to support
an invalidation of Ordinance 4321 are unclear. But,
Appellants’ claims unquestionably relate to alleged errors in
the annexation hearings. In the past, our Supreme Court
has determined that errors in notice, public hearings and
plans of service fall within the ambit of “procedural defects[,]”
Southwest Tenn. Elec. Mem., Corp., 359 S.W.3d at 604
(citing City of Watauga, 589 S.W.2d at 905) and “courts have
no power to vacate an annexation ordinance for purely
procedural defects.” City of Watauga, 589 S.W.2d at 906.
Because the Appellants do not allege that Ordinance 4321
adopted by the City Council “exceeded the authority
delegated by the legislature,” and the grounds raised for
invalidating Ordinance 4321 are properly classified as
“procedural defects.” Appellants were required to challenge
the Ordinance 4321 through the quo warranto procedure.
[At 581.]
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WHO MAY CHALLENGE ANNEXATIONS BY ORDINANCE?
“Aggrieved Owners of Property”
Under T.C.A. § 6-51-103(a)(1)(A) any “aggrieved owners of property” that borders on or
lies within the territory annexed have 30 days to challenge an annexation. Notwithstanding the statutory language that gives abutting landowners the right to challenge an
annexation, State ex. rel. Cordova Area Residents for the Environment v. City of
Memphis, 862 S.W.2d 525 (Tenn. App.1992), held that part of the statute
unconstitutional. For that reason, only the owners of property that lies within the
territory proposed for annexation have standing to challenge the annexation.
An aggrieved owner of property challenging an annexation loses his cause of action
upon his transfer of ownership of the property. McNamee v. City of Knoxville, 824
S.W.2d 550 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).
A county that owned a mere easement in county roads in the territory sought to be
annexed was not an “aggrieved owner of property” within the meaning of T.C.A. § 6-51103(a)(2)(A), held State ex rel. Kessel v. Ashe, 888 S.W.2d 430 (Tenn. 1994). In that
case, the county admitted that it did not own the fee to its roads. The court
distinguished Spoone v. Mayor of Morristown, 431 S.W.2d 827 (1968), in which the
court had earlier held that a county that owned the roads and a school in the area
proposed for annexation was an aggrieved owner of property. The county’s interest in
the roads in that case was not clear, and the question was whether a legal person as
well as a natural person could qualify as an “owner of property” under T.C.A. § 6-51103(a)(2)(A).
TIME FOR CHALLENGING ANNEXATIONS BY ORDINANCE
Quo Warranto Challenges
An annexation ordinance becomes effective 30 days after its final passage. T.C.A.
§ 6-51-102(a)(1). An “aggrieved owner of property” lying within the annexed territory
can, prior to the operative date of the annexation, file a quo warranto suit to contest the
reasonableness of the annexation in accordance with T.C.A. Title 6, Chapter 51, Part 1,
T.C.A. § 6-51-103 and T.C.A., Title 29, Chapter 35. T.C.A. § 6-51-103 says:
After 30 days have passed, a quo warranto suit against the
annexation is not subject to judicial review and cannot be
filed. [Bastnagel v. Memphis, 457 S.W.2d 532 (1970); City
of Oak Ridge v. Roane County, 563 S.W.2d 895 (Tenn.
1978).] In the unreported case of Coleman v. City of
Memphis, 2001 WL 1381277 (Tenn. Ct. App.), the court also
held that a quo warranto suit filed by the plaintiff was not
filed within 30 days when on August 1, 1995, the city council
passed the annexation ordinance on third and final reading;
on August 15, 1995, a motion to reconsider the ordinance
passed; on August 29, 1995, the plaintiffs filed a quo
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warranto suit to which they attached the annexation
ordinance adopted by the city on August 1, 1995. The
ordinance underwent significant changes between August 15
and the date of its final passage on September 19, 1995.
“For this reason,” concluded the court, “it is apparent that
when Plaintiffs filed their suit on August 29, 1995, they were
not ‘aggrieved property owners’ as the ordinance was still
being debated and amended throughout the city’s legislative
process.” [At 5.]
The right to commence a new action within one year from
the date of a voluntary nonsuit under T.C.A. § 28-1-105 does
not apply to quo warranto suits against annexation
ordinances. [Brent v. Town of Greeneville, 309 S.W.2d 121
(1958).]
CHALLENGES BY DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
Constitutional challenges and challenges reflecting ultra vires annexations are not
subject to the 30-day limit contained in T.C.A. § 6-51-102(a)(1). [State ex rel. Earhart v.
City of Bristol, 970 S.W.2d 948 (Tenn. 1998).] For an analysis of Earhart and other
cases that have interpreted that case, see above and Chapter 9, Problem Annexations.
LAWSUIT VENUE
A suit contesting an annexation of territory in a county other than the one in which the
municipality's city hall is located shall be filed in the county where the city hall is located.
The chancellor must then change the venue to a county adjacent to either the county
where the city hall is located or the county where the proposed annexed territory is
located. T.C.A. § 6-51-103(g).
ABANDONMENT AND REPEAL OF ANNEXATION PROCEEDINGS
T.C.A. § 6-51-106 provides that “Any annexation proceedings initiated under § 6-51-102
or § 6-51-104 may be abandoned and discontinued at any time by resolution of the
governing body of the municipality.” This statute applies only where the annexation has
been “initiated” but not finally passed. However, an annexation ordinance finally passed
can be repealed even after it has been challenged, provided the repeal has been done
by ordinance (not by motion or resolution). The repeal of an annexation ordinance
renders the ordinance moot. Lee v. City of Chattanooga, 500 S.W.2d 917 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); City of Bluff City v. Morrell, 764 S.W.2d
200 (Tenn. 1988); Schaltenbrand v. City of Knoxville, 788 S.W.2d 812 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1989).
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LIMITATION ON FUTURE ANNEXATION IF ANNEXATION ORDINANCE HELD
UNREASONABLE
If the court finds that the annexation ordinance is unreasonable or has been done by the
exercise of powers not conferred by law it “shall” issue an order vacating the ordinance,
and the city shall be prohibited from annexing any part of the territory proposed for
annexation by the vacated ordinance for a period of at least 24 months following the
date of the order. If the court finds the ordinance reasonable, it is operative 31 days
after the judgment unless an appeal has been taken. A similar rule applies to
judgments on the appeal of the annexation ordinance, except that if the ordinance is
upheld it is operative “forthwith by court order.” T.C.A. § 6-51-103(c). In the unreported
case of Cathey v. City of Dickson, 2002 WL 970429 (Tenn. Ct. App.), it was held that
the 24-month ban does not apply to annexation ordinances that have been repealed;
the repeal does not reflect an admission by the city that the ordinance was
unreasonable.
PLAN OF SERVICES
A city annexing territory by ordinance or by referendum, must adopt a plan of services
that outlines the services to be provided in the territory proposed for annexation and the
timing of those services. [See Chapter 6, Plan of Services.]
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CHAPTER 6
PLAN OF SERVICES1
ANNEXATION BY ORDINANCE
Plan of Service Required
Under Public Acts 1998, Chapter 1101, a city annexing territory by ordinance was
required to adopt a plan of services that outlined the services to be provided to the
annexed area and the timing of those services. Public Acts 2005, Chapter 411,
amended T.C.A. § 6-51-104(b) to require that a plan of services be adopted for
annexations by referendum. [See Chapter 4, Annexation by Referendum.]
Effective Date of Plan of Services Requirement
For an annexation ordinance that was not final on November 25, 1997, where the city
had not prepared a plan of services, it had 60 days to prepare one. [Chapter 1101, § 20;
T.C.A. § 6-51-102(a)(2).] Presumably, such a plan of services must have met the same
reasonableness standard as to the scope and implementation schedule as prescribed
by T.C.A. § 6-51-102(b) for annexations accomplished by cities after the effective date
of Chapter 1101 (May 19, 1998). [See Plan of Services Must be Reasonable,
immediately below.]
Plan of Services Must Be Reasonable
Under T.C.A. § 6-51-102 [annexation by ordinance] the plan of services must be
“reasonable” with respect to both the scope of services and to the implementation
schedule. The implementation schedule must provide for delivery of services in the new
territory that are comparable to those provided to all citizens of the city. The plan must
address the following services, whether or not the city currently provides those services:







Police and fire protection;
Water, electrical, and sanitary services;
Road and street construction and repair;
Recreational facilities and programs;
Street lighting; and
Zoning services.

The plan may exclude services that are provided by another public or private agency
other than those services provided by the county. The city may include services in
addition to those required to be addressed. T.C.A. § 6-51-102(b).

1

For sample resolutions on plans of services, see Appendices D and E.
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Submission of Plan of Services to Planning Commission
Before its adoption, the plan of services must be submitted to the planning commission
(if the city has one), which must issue a written report on it within 90 days. (The 90-day
deadline can be extended by the city governing body by resolution if it chooses to do
so.) In an unpublished opinion, New Providence Utility District v. Clarksville, filed
November 14, 1966, the Tennessee Supreme Court considered an objection that
“approval of the plan of services by the Planning Commission by a resolution, and a
certified copy of such resolution” did not comply with the statutory requirement “that a
written report of the Commission’s study of the plan be furnished the City.” In rejecting
this contention the court said:
The submission of the plan of services to the Planning
Commission and its report to the legislative body of the
municipality is part of the legislative process. The form and
sufficiency of the report is a matter for determination by the
legislative body and not the courts. The Planning
Commission had the alternative of approving, modifying or
rejecting the plan of services submitted to it for study. That
body adopted the resolution approving the plan and so
reported to the City Council by a certified copy of the
resolution. There is nothing in the statute that requires the
Planning Commission to report to the City Council its
findings in any particular form.
Public Notice and Hearing on Plan of Services
The city’s governing body is required to hold a public hearing on the plan after giving 15
days notice in a newspaper of general circulation in the city. The notice must include at
least three locations where copies of the plan are available for public inspection. T.C.A.
§ 6-51-102(b).
Notice of Plan of Services to County Mayor
Public Acts 2005, Chapter 411, amended T.C.A. § 6-51-102(b)(1) [annexation by
ordinance] and T.C.A. § 6-51-104 [annexation by referendum] to require that after a
plan of services is adopted, the municipality shall forward a copy of it to the county
mayor in whose county the territory being annexed is located.
Notice of Plan of Services to Emergency Communications Districts
Public Acts 2005, Chapter 411, amends T.C.A. § 6-51-119(a) to require that upon the
final passage of an annexation ordinance the legislative body of the annexing
municipality provide to any affected emergency communications district a copy of the
portion of the plan of services dealing with emergency services and a detailed map
designating the annexed area. The map must identify all public and private streets,
including street names and direction indicators, in the annexed area. The map must
also include or have appended a list of address ranges for each street in the annexed
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area. For contested annexation ordinances, in cases in which the municipality plans to
begin providing emergency services in the annexed territory immediately, the
municipality must notify the emergency communications district when the annexation
becomes final.
The notification must be sent by certified return receipt mail or any other method that
assures receipt by the district.
Section 6-51-119 provides that compliance or noncompliance with this provision is not
admissible against the municipality in any case brought under T.C.A., Title 6
[presumably Chapter 51, which governs annexation and challenges to annexation], Title
29, Chapter 14 [the Declaratory Judgments Act, under which challenges against
annexations upon grounds other than the reasonableness of the annexation would be
brought], or against the municipality or any affected emergency communications district
under T.C.A., Title 29, Chapter 20 [the Tennessee Tort Liability Act].
For similar notice provisions that apply to annexations by ordinance, see Chapter 5,
Annexation by Ordinance. For similar notice provisions that apply to annexations by
referendum, see Chapter 4, Annexation by Referendum.
ANNEXATION PROHIBITED IF CITY IS IN “DEFAULT” ON PRIOR PLAN/S OF
SERVICE
A city cannot annex “any other territory” under T.C.A. § 6-51-102 “if the municipality is in
default on any prior plan of services.” It was widely reasoned that limitation applied only
to annexations that were not final on November 25, 1997, and forward from that date.
Chapter 1101, §§ 19 and 20; T.C.A. § 6-51-102(a) and (b)(5); T.C.A. § 6-51-108(b).
But in unreported State ex rel Cain v. City of Church Hill, Slip Copy, 2008 WL 4415579
(Tenn. Ct. App.), it was declared that T.C.A. § 6-51-108 could be applied retroactively.
This case arose on appeal by the city from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment
to the plaintiffs who argued that under T.C.A. § 6-51-108, they were entitled to sewer
service with respect to the city’s annexation of their property and its plan of services
dated in 1988. The trial court issued a writ of mandamus requiring the city to extend
sewer service to the plaintiff’s property within 16 months. The city had unsuccessfully
argued that T.C.A. § 6-51-108 should not be applied retroactively and that the plan of
services had provided that, “A sanitary sewer system will be provided as soon as
economically feasible. A study will have to be conducted to determine the cost.” [At 2.]
The Court vacated the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded the case
to the trial court for further proceedings.
But on the question of whether T.C.A. § 6-51-108 should be applied retroactively, the
Court said:
…The City argues that the general presumption against
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applying laws retroactively, see, generally Nutt v. Champion
Intern, Corp. 980 S.W.2d 365, 368 (Tenn. 1998), should
prevent retroactive application here, since, as the trial court
put it, [t]he legislature has not given us any guidance as to
how they intended it to apply; where they intended it to be
applicable and how that was to work.” However, as the
plaintiff correctly points out, this presumption is reversed “for
statutes which are remedial or procedural in nature. Such
statutes apply retrospectively … unless the legislature
indicates a contrary intention or immediate application would
produce an unjust result.” Kee v. Shelter Ins., 852 S.W.2d
226, 228 (Tenn. 1993). The right to enforce a plan of
services via mandamus under Tenn. Code Ann. § 6-51108(d) is clearly a remedial right, and we think the statute as
a whole is essentially “remedial or procedural” in nature. We
also see no reason to conclude that the retroactive
application in this case “would produce an unjust result.”
Accordingly, we conclude that the statute is applicable in this
case. [At 6.]
This part of the Court’s decision appears to potentially put the sewer service parts of
plans of services adopted in connection with annexations that pre-date November 25,
1997 on the judicial firing line.
But the Court had a problem with the trial court’s conclusion that the plaintiffs were
entitled to summary judgement:
Because the plan of services makes only a conditional
promise of sewer service-conditioned upon economic
feasibility-a proper grant of summary judgement for the
plaintiffs would necessarily require a finding that there was
no disputed issue of material fact regarding the economic
feasibility of the sewer service. Yet no such finding was ever
made…. [At 7.]
The Court pointed out that the dispute between the plaintiffs and the city over whether
the sewer extension to the plaintiff’s property was economically feasible was “hotly
disputed.” For that reason, declared the Court, “The plaintiff’s simply did not
demonstrate for summary judgment purposes, that they were entitled to a ‘judgement
on the papers’.” [At 7.]
The Court also rejected the plaintiff’s attempt to apply an “implied contract theory of the
recovery”:
Much ink has been spilled, by both sides, regarding matters
2014 Municipal Technical Advisory Service -- 38

that relate only to the implied contract theory: what
statements were, or were not, made by which city officials;
what actions the city council took, or did not take; whether
the completion of the sewer line constitutes only a ministerial
act, because of prior city council resolution, or whether it
remains a discretionary act; and so forth. [At 7.]
None of those issues related to the sole question of whether the plaintiffs were entitled
to summary judgment. But it is reasonable to speculate that the theories of economic
feasibility of the sewer extension to the annexed property, and of implied contracts, not
to mention other possible theories, for requiring cities to provide sewer service to
annexed property under plans of service that date prior to November 25, 1997 will be
raised again.
It is not clear whether a plaintiff could bring a quo warranto challenge to an annexation
by ordinance on the ground that it is unreasonable because the city is in default on a
plan of services from a previous annexation. But, presumably, such a challenge could
be brought under the Declaratory Judgments Act found at T.C.A. § 29-14-101 et seq. on
the ground that the annexation violates the annexation statute. [See Chapter 5,
Annexation by Ordinance, Challenges to the Ordinance Based on Constitutional and
Other Grounds, and Chapter 9, Problem Annexations.]
CHALLENGING A PLAN OF SERVICES
It does not appear that T.C.A. § 6-51-102 or § 6-51-108 give property owners the right
to challenge the reasonableness of a plan of services separate from their individual
rights to challenge the annexation ordinance based upon their status as property
owners in the annexed territory. However, arguably, property owners have the right to
challenge the reasonableness of the annexation; presumably they can argue that the
annexation is unreasonable on the ground that the plan of services is unreasonable or
that the territory in question does not need the services contained in the plan of
services. [Chapter 1101, § 20; T.C.A. § 6-51-102; T.C.A. § 6-51-103. See Chapter 5,
Annexation by Ordinance, Trial and Burden of Proof.] But that may not be true, given
that a remedy for enforcing the plan of services is prescribed by the annexation law.
[See Enforcing the Plan of Services, immediately below.]
ENFORCING THE PLAN OF SERVICES
A property owner subject to the plan of services can sue the city to enforce the plan of
services 180 days following the date the annexation ordinance becomes effective. That
right to sue is extinguished when the plan of services is fulfilled. [T.C.A. § 6-51-108(d).]
If the court finds that the city has “materially and substantially” failed to comply with its
plan of services, the city must be given the opportunity to show cause for the failure. If
the court determines that the failure is due to natural disaster, act of war, terrorism, or
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reasonably unforeseen circumstances beyond the control of the city that materially and
substantially impeded its ability to carry out the plan of services, the court can alter the
timetable of the plan. But if the court finds that the city’s failure to comply with the plan
of services is none of those reasons, it “shall”:




Issue a writ of mandamus to compel the city to provide the services contained in
the plan;
Establish a timetable for providing those services; and
Enjoin the city from any further annexations until the services subject to the
court’s order have been provided to the court’s satisfaction. T.C.A. § 6-51-109.

Progress Report on Plan of Services6
Six months after the plan is adopted and annually thereafter until it is fully implemented
the city must publish a report on its progress toward fulfilling the plan and must
schedule and hold a public hearing on the report. These reporting and hearing
requirements apply to any plan of services not fully implemented, and any resident or
property owner in the annexed area covered by the plan can file suit to force a city to
prepare this report if it has not done so on schedule. T.C.A. § 6-51-108.
Amending a Plan of Services
A plan of services may be amended under limited conditions:




An occurrence such as a natural disaster, an act of war, terrorism, or other
unforeseen circumstances beyond the city’s control; or
The amendment does not substantially or materially decrease the type or level of
services or delay the provisions of such services; or
The amendment has received approval in writing of a majority of the property
owners by parcel in the annexed area.

Before any amendment is adopted, the city must hold a public hearing preceded by at
least 15 days notice. T.C.A. § 6-51-108(c).
An aggrieved property owner in the annexed territory can challenge the legality of an
amendment to the plan of services within 30 days after the amendment is adopted. If
the court finds that the city unlawfully amended the plan, it shall “decree the amendment
null and void and shall reinstate the previous plan of services.” T.C.A. § 6-51-108(d).
ANNEXATION BY REFERENDUM
T.C.A. § 6-51-104(b) [annexation by referendum] provides that “the plan of services
shall address the same services and timing of services as required in § 6-51-102"

6

See Appendix F for sample progress report on plan of services.
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[annexation by ordinance]. [See Chapter 4, Annexation by Referendum, Notice and
Public Hearing on Annexation and Plan of Services Required.]
That act does not indicate to what extent the above statutes apply to plans of services in
annexations by referendum. It is not clear whether that language embraces statutes
governing annexation by ordinance that deal with a broad range of plan of services
issues, including the effect of the failure of cities to fulfill prior plans of services,
progress reports on plans of services, amending plans of services, and challenging and
enforcing plans of services. It should probably be assumed that they do.
For this reason, a city contemplating annexation by referendum should consider drafting
a plan of services that would survive a legal challenge as if it had been done in
connection with an annexation by ordinance.
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CHAPTER 7
“POPULATION BRACKETS” CONTAINED IN THE ANNEXATION LAW
Generally
Tennessee statutes are rife with various “population brackets” under which cities and
counties in Tennessee are excepted from, or included under, a statute or statutes. The
same was true of numerous Tennessee annexation statutes. Some of those population
brackets were eliminated over time. [See in particular, Frost v. City of Chattanooga,
488 S.W.2d 370 (Tenn. 1972), Pirtle v. City of Jackson, 560 S.W.2d 400 (Tenn. 1977),
Vollmer v. City of Memphis, 730 S.W.2d 619 (Tenn. 1987), below.] But Public Acts
2014, Chapter 707, § 2, deleted T.C.A. § 6-51-102(a), (c) and (d), which had contained
most of the remaining population brackets.
Article XI, § 8, of the Tennessee Constitution provides that “The Legislature shall have
no power to suspend any general law for the benefit of any particular individual....” That
provision has repeatedly been interpreted to prohibit the passage of laws containing
population brackets and other classifications to benefit specific counties or cities as well
as individuals, including private acts that suspend general laws, unless the classification
rests upon a reasonable basis. [See, among the literally dozens of cases in this area,
Vollmer v. City of Memphis, 730 S.W.2d 619 (Tenn. 1987); Mink v. City of Memphis,
435 S.W.2d 114 (1968); Stalcup v. City of Gatlinburg, 577 S.W.2d 439 (Tenn. 1978);
Knoxville’s Community Development Corp. v. Knox County, 665 S.W.2d 704 (Tenn.
1984); Brentwood Liquors Corp of Williamson County v. Fox, 496 S.W.2d 454 (Tenn.
1973); Estrin v. Moss, 430 S.W.2d 345 (1968); Pirtle v. City of Jackson, 560 S.W.2d 400
(1977); Clark v. Vaughn, 146 S.W.2d 351 (1941); Lineberger v. State ex rel. Beeler, 129
S.W.2d 198 (1939); State ex rel Smith v. City of Chattanooga, 144 S.W.2d 1096 (1940);
Town of McMinnville v. Curtis, 192 S.W.2d 998 (1946); Prescott v. Duncan, 148 S.W.
229 (1912); Board of Education v. Shelby County, 330 S.W.2d 569 (1960); Johnson City
v. Allison, 362 S.W.2d 813 (1962); State ex rel. v. Mayor of Dyersburg, 235 S.W.2d 814
(1954); Wiseman v. Smith, 95 S.W.2d 42 (1936); Blackwell v. Miller, 493 S.W.3d 88
(Tenn. 1973); and numerous cases cited therein.]
POPULATION AND OTHER BRACKETS IN ANNEXATION PRIORITIES STATUTE
Population brackets are also found in T.C.A. §§ 6-51-109 and 110. These population
brackets may also violate Article XI, § 8, of the Tennessee Constitution.
T.C.A. § 6-51-109 provides for the annexation by a larger municipality of all or part of
the territory in a smaller municipality upon the petition of 20 percent of the voters of the
smaller municipality if the larger municipality annexes by ordinance the territory
proposed in the petition and the annexation is approved in a referendum by a majority of
voters in the smaller municipality. T.C.A. § 6-51-110(g) authorizes annexation by a
smaller municipality of territory within the corporate limits of a larger municipality if the
territory is fewer than 75 acres and meets other qualifications. T.C.A. § 6-51-110(a)
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contains several questionable population and other brackets that are apparently aimed
at T.C.A. § 6-51-109 and T.C.A. § 6-51-110(g). Moreover, T.C.A. § 6-51-109 and
T.C.A. § 6-51-110(g) should probably be examined to determine whether they serve any
useful purpose.
T.C.A. § 6-51-110(a) provides that nothing in this part [T.C.A.,Title 6, Chapter 51, part 1]
nor in T.C.A. § 6-51-301 [mutual adjustments provision] shall be construed to authorize
a smaller municipality to annex territory within the corporate limits of a larger
municipality. It also says the same thing with respect to the annexation by a larger
municipality within the corporate limits of a smaller municipality in existence at the time
of the proposed annexation except as to municipalities:




In counties with a population of not less than 65,000 nor more than 66,000
according to the 1970 or subsequent federal census;
In counties with a population of 400,000 or more according to the 1970 or
subsequent federal census; and
In counties having a metropolitan government, by a larger municipality with
respect to territory within the corporate limits of a smaller municipality in
existence for 10 or more years.

In addition, the same statute provides that, notwithstanding any other provisions in this
chapter [T.C.A., Title 6, Chapter 51] in counties having a population of not less than
276,000 nor more than 277,000 according to the 1970 or subsequent federal census,
nothing in this part [T.C.A., Title 6, Chapter 51, Part 1] shall be construed to authorize
annexation by a larger municipality of territory within the corporate limits of any smaller
municipality in existence at the time of the proposed annexation.
T.C.A. § 6-51-110(d) also contains population brackets and another bracket with
respect to when an annexation ordinance is initiated as to annexation priorities. The
brackets exempt from the application of the statute counties having a population of not
less than 65,000 nor more than 66,000 and counties having a population of 400,000 or
more according to the 1970 or subsequent federal census. It also exempts counties with
a metropolitan government.
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CHAPTER 8
ANNEXATION AND PLAN OF SERVICES
PUBLIC NOTICE AND HEARING ISSUES7
STATUTORY ANNEXATION ORDINANCE AND PLAN OF SERVICES HEARING
REQUIREMENTS
Generally
The public notice and hearing requirements for annexation ordinances and plans of
services were strengthened by Public Acts 1998, Chapter 1101, and by subsequent
statutes. However, some of the pre-Chapter 1101 cases interpreting and applying the
annexation ordinance public hearing requirements (there are no such cases interpreting
and applying the plan of services public hearing requirements) probably apply to the
public notice and hearing requirements for annexations by referendum in Chapter 1101.
But some of those cases reflect the failure of cities to strictly abide by the public hearing
and notice requirements. Such a failure might not necessarily be fatal to an annexation
or to a plan of services, but it invites that result and always gives the person challenging
the annexation another issue to present to the court. Such failures are easy to avoid by
knowing and strictly obeying public notice and hearing requirements contained in the
annexation laws.
Several recent statutes require cities to give the county mayor and emergency
communications districts notice of both annexations and plans of services. This chapter
deals only with statutes and cases dealing with public notice requirements. [See
Chapter 4, Annexation by Referendum; Chapter 5, Annexation by Ordinance; and
Chapter 6, Plan of Services for the above notice requirements.]
LEGAL STATUS OF DEFECTS IN ANNEXATION BY ORDINANCE AND
ANNEXATION BY REFERENDUM
Public notice and plan of services hearing issues were determined in annexation by
ordinance cases to be procedural in nature. It is said in Highwood Properties, Inc. v.
City of Memphis, 297 S.W.3d 695 (Tenn. 2009), that:
[T]he courts have no power to vacate an annexation
ordinance for purely procedural defects because no such
authority has been granted by statute. City of Watauga v.
City of Johnson City, 589 S.W.2d 901, 906 (Tenn. 1979).
Rather, the general rule is that defects in an annexation
ordinance must be presented in the context of a challenge to
its reasonableness or necessity by way of a timely quo
warranto challenge. City of Oak Ridge, 583 S.W.2d at 898;
7

For sample resolutions for a public hearing on annexation by referendum and by ordinance, see
Appendices D and E.
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see also City of Knoxville v. State ex rel. Graves, 207 Tenn.
558, 341 S.W.2d 718, 721 (1960) holding that allegation was
passed without a public hearing should be considered in
connection with the question of the reasonableness of the
ordinance. (Internal quotation marks omitted by writer). [At
208.]
A “timely” quo warranto challenge to an annexation ordinance must be brought within
thirty days of the final passage of the annexation ordinance.
Quo warranto challenges to annexations by referendum are not authorized by
Tennessee annexation law. But Public Acts 2014, Chapter 707 preserved Tennessee
Code Annotated, § 6-51-102(b) which presently provides for a plan of services in both
annexation by ordinance and annexation by referendum. Tennessee Code Annotated,
§ 6-51-102(b)(1) requires that “The plan of services shall be reasonable with respect to
the scope of services to be provided and the timing of services.”
But the notice requirements for annexation by referendum are particularly strict,
directing that each property in the territory be given notice of the proposed annexation.
[See Chapter 4, Annexation by Referendum.]
Plan of Services
T.C.A. § 6-51-102(b)(4) provides that before the plan of services is adopted, the city
must hold a public hearing. Notice of the time, place, and purpose of the public hearing
“shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality not less
than fifteen (15) days before the hearing.” The notice must also include the locations of
a minimum of three copies of the plan of service, which the municipality must also make
available for public inspection during all business hours from the date of notice of the
public hearing.
PUBLIC NOTICE AND HEARING ISSUES
City Charter Generally Governs Annexation Ordinance and Probably Annexation
Resolution Procedures
There are no formal annexation ordinance or resolution procedures prescribed by
Tennessee’s annexation law. That is also true of annexation by referendum.
Annexation ordinances should be adopted following the ordinance procedures
prescribed by the annexing city’s charter. It was held in State ex rel. Balsinger v. Town
of Madisonville, 435 S.W.2d 803 (1968), that an annexation ordinance was not required
to be read at three separate meetings because neither the state’s annexation law nor
the charter required such a procedure. With respect to annexation by referendum,
generally most municipal charters in Tennessee either do not provide for resolution
procedures or require their passage on only one reading. However, where a charter
does prescribe resolution procedures, they should be followed.
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T.C.A. § 6-51-102(a)(1) provided that a city “after notice and public hearing, by
ordinance, could extend its corporate limits by annexation....” In the unreported case of
State ex rel. Gentry v. City of Bristol (Tenn. Ct. App., June 5, 1972), an annexation
ordinance was attacked on the ground that the ordinance was passed on first reading
prior to the public hearing. Under the city’s charter, it took two readings to pass the
ordinance. The record showed that the ordinance was passed on first reading on
December 1, 1970; that notice was thereafter published and a public hearing held on
December 15, 1970; and that the ordinance was passed on second and final reading
immediately after the public hearing. The court was of the opinion that there was
substantial compliance with the statute.
Where the charter of the city provided that no ordinance could be adopted at the same
meeting at which introduced, the requirements of T.C.A. § 6-51-102 were met by having
the public hearing four days after the introduction but before the ordinance was
adopted. [Pirtle v. City of Jackson, 570 S.W.2d 400 (Tenn. 1977).]
Even irregularities in city ordinance adoption procedures may be “forgiven” in some
cases. An annexation ordinance in Saylors v. City of Jackson, 575 S.W.2d 246 (Tenn.
1978), was held valid even though it had not received a second as required by Robert’s
Rules of Order (RRO), which the city had adopted to govern its meeting procedures,
because the action on the ordinance was unanimous. RRO declares that where such
action is unanimous, a violation of the rules is without consequence.
Changing the Area to Be Annexed
The question of whether a city can describe an area being considered for annexation,
for purposes of the public hearing, and subsequently annex parts of the area by several
ordinances, perhaps in all less than the area on which the hearing was conducted, was
raised in Senff v. Columbia, 343 S.W.2d 888 (1961). The Tennessee Supreme Court
appears to have approved such procedure:
As a result of this notice and hearing an ordinance was not
drawn immediately to take in the whole area pursuant to the
notice but numerous and various ordinances were passed
taking in smaller areas within the areas as prescribed in the
notice, the very obvious reason being that in many of these
other areas the people were asking for it and they knew
there would be no contest about it. [At 889.]
In Maury County Farmers Co-op Corp. v. Columbia, 362 S.W.2d 219 (1962), it was held
that an annexation ordinance could annex two separate areas that were not contiguous
to each other as long as each was contiguous to the city. To the argument that the
annexation of one area might be found to be reasonable and the annexation of the other
unreasonable, the court responded that “the part of the ordinance describing that area
might be eliminated under the familiar doctrine of elision.” [At 221.]
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ADEQUACY OF PUBLIC NOTICE AND HEARING
Generally
There are no reported cases involving the adequacy of the public hearing on plans of
services. Arguably, the cases involving the adequacy of the public hearing in annexation
cases apply to the public hearings on the plan of services. However, Morton v. Johnson
City, 333 S.W.2d 924 (Tenn. 1979) speaks of the “political” component of the
annexation hearing:
…The words here in the Statute of a “public hearing” were
not used with respect to a proceeding in which the
constitutional rights of any person might be affected. The
subject before the Commission was the adoption of an
ordinance annexing the territory in question. Such a hearing
as is required under the political or legislative issue of this
kind is a kind of hearing that is to be accorded so that this
body may make up its mind from a political standpoint
[Emphasis is mine.] in their legislative action as to whether
or not it is feasible and right to annex this territory.
In Commonwealth v. Sisson, 189 Mass 247, 75 NE 619, 1
LRS, NS, 752, 109 Am. St. Rep. 630, the Massachusetts
court had before it the question of whether or not the Board
of Health acting in a legislative capacity gave a proper kind
of hearing under a similar act which required a public
hearing. The court held…a board…acting in a legislative
capacity…is not required to act on sworn evidence…its
action is final as is the action of the legislature in enacting
the statute…[and] questions of fact passed on in adopting
the provisions cannot be tried over in the courts. In other
words the only suggestions and the only requirement under
this statute is that it be public; that the City Commission have
an open public hearing so that they can hear those who are
for or against the proposition and then make up their own
minds from a legislative standpoint of whether or not such an
ordinance would be feasible in view of their legislative duty to
the City.
This presents, under the facts in this case, a question of law
for the Court to determine. There was no action being taken
at this meeting by the Commission; there was no reason why
the Commission should enter into an agreement pro or con
with those appearing to speak their piece on behalf of this
legislation. The only question was to allow those that
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wished to stay and say their piece to be allowed to do so and
then the Commission could make up its own legislative mind.
[At 929.]
Some of the same political considerations apply to hearings on plans of services, but
given the Tennessee Open Records Law and the increasing statutory regulation of
plans of services, the governing body of an annexing municipality should properly insure
that the plan of services receives the weighty attention that it deserves.
Inaccurate Descriptions of Territory to Be Annexed
It has been held that an inaccurate description did not invalidate an annexation because
an appended map correctly showed the territory to be annexed. [Johnson City v.
Maden, 304 S.W.2d 317 (1957).] However, great care should be taken to ensure that
the public hearings on annexations reflect maps and boundary descriptions of the
territory proposed for annexation that are consistent and accurate.
Inadequate Notice of Hearing
In State ex rel. Robbins v. City of Jackson, 403 S.W.2d 304 (1966), an official notice
published only five days in advance, taken together with a news article referring to the
public hearing to be held and setting forth the area proposed for annexation, which
appeared in the newspaper seven days prior to the public hearing, was held to be
substantial compliance with the statute. But it is not clear how much tolerance the courts
will exercise when there has been a failure of adequate notice in terms of time. In
Surgoinsville v. Sandidge, 866 S.W.2d 553 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993), 11 days notice of a
public hearing on an amendment to a zoning ordinance was held not to be substantial
compliance when T.C.A. § 13-7-203 required “at least” 15 days notice.
An annexation ordinance was attacked in Senff v. Columbia, 343 S.W.2d 888 (1961), on
the ground that the notice was insufficient because it had been given too long (nine
months) before the ordinance was adopted. Holding that the notice was adequate, the
court reasoned that for approximately nine months after the notice was given the
proposed annexation received constant publicity in the newspaper.
Location and Environment of Public Meeting
The location and environment of the meeting involving the passage of an annexation
ordinance have also been issues. As to the location of a public hearing, the Tennessee
Supreme Court in Morton v. Johnson City, 333 S.W.2d 924 (Tenn. 1979), said this:
The call was for a meeting at the City Hall before the City
Commission. This notice did not designate any particular
room and of course the very obvious and only place that the
meeting should and would be held, unless designated
otherwise in the notice, is in the regular chambers of the City
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Commission. Thus it is that the notice was sufficient to notify
the inhabitants that the meeting would be in the Commission
room.... [At 930.]
In that case 300 people were gathered outside the meeting room, which could hold only
40 people. The city commission refused to adjourn to another room but announced that
it would hear everyone who wished to speak, “even if it took all night to do it.” Many of
those who were present did not stay, but the commission heard anyone who wished to
speak. The public hearing was adequate, declared the court, while it spoke of the
purpose of the public hearing.
The court also gave clear instructions regarding the time of holding a public hearing:
The day that this public hearing was called for and held was
on a Tuesday night while the regular meetings of the
Commission were on Thursday night... The argument is that
then this was not properly called because not held on a
regular night. Of course this public hearing or hearing as was
conducted by the Commission did not have to be on their
meeting night....They could have this meeting anytime that
they saw fit to have these public hearings. [At 930.]
Morton stands for the clear proposition that the purpose of the public hearing
requirement is that the governing body “hear” any person who wishes to speak for or
against the annexation proposal. It was cited in State v. City of Columbia, 360 S.W.2d
39 (1962), in which the Tennessee Supreme Court also held the public hearing on an
annexation ordinance adequate. There, 100 to 125 people were present for the hearing,
and all who wished to do so were permitted to speak, “with the possible exception of
one man, who jumped up so frequently he was asked to keep quiet.” The meeting
lasted about 90 minutes with a break of approximately 20 minutes. [At 42.]
In Stall v. Knoxville, 364 S.W.2d 898 (1962), the adequacy of the public hearing was
also brought under attack. The court referred to the criteria set out in Morton v. Johnson
City, above, and concluded:
The Trial Judge found in the instant cases that these
requirements were met, and the record clearly supports him
in this regard. Proper notice of the hearing was given. It was
held at the time and place designated in the notice. The
council members were present with the mayor presiding, the
doors were opened to the public. The record shows that
opinions and discussions were invited and that many
opinions were given and much discussion was had. The
council chambers might not have seated all who wished to
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come. However, the record shows that the meeting lasted for
several hours and anyone who wished to be heard had the
floor. [At 901.]
When an annexation ordinance reaches the stage of a public hearing a majority of the
city’s governing body is probably a proponent of the annexation, but before and during
the hearing the board should not take a hard position that indicates the matter is a
“done deal.” The purpose of the public hearing is to provide an opportunity for objectors
to bring to their attention any facts and relevant considerations that might have escaped
their attention. In Maury County Farmers Co-op v. Columbia, 362 S.W.2d 219 (1962),
the Tennessee Supreme Court considered an objection that “the city commissioners
had already made up their legislative minds to annex,” based upon certain answers
given by one of the commissioners on cross-examination but rejected it on the grounds:
...that a reading of the whole of the testimony clearly shows
that while the commissioners had proposed such
annexation, as shown in the public notice, they had not
foreclosed their minds, but afforded a fair and proper hearing
and passed the ordinance only after careful consideration of
the need and effect of the annexation.
[At 221-22.]
Generally, a governing body should simply “hear” persons who wish to speak during
public hearings on annexation ordinances and resolutions and make no effort to justify
the annexation proposal; to do so will usually lead to long and meaningless arguments.
A good procedure is for the mayor or other presiding officer to recognize each person
who wishes to speak and thank him courteously at the conclusion of his remarks. If the
crowd is large, the governing body may wish to direct that slips of paper or cards to be
signed by persons who desire to speak be circulated among the audience and direct the
presiding officer to call on them in some order. It may also direct that a time limit be
imposed on each speaker.
Recent public attention to defects in public hearings for lack of the ability of the
audience to hear the proceedings should probably be taken into account when
annexation and plan of services hearings are scheduled. Such public meetings
frequently cause controversy and unusually large public attendance. For that reason,
the environment of the meeting and its ability to accommodate crowds and sometimes
noise should be considered.
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CHAPTER 9
“PROBLEM” ANNEXATIONS
GENERALLY - PROCEDURAL VIOLATIONS
Following Bristol v. Earhart, 970 S.W.2d 695 (Tenn. 1970), there was debate over
whether that case applied only to annexations that did not contain any people, private
property or commercial property. Highwoods Properties, Inc. v. City of Memphis, 297
S.W.3d 695 (Tenn. 2009) addressed that question:
In State ex rel. Earhart v. City of Bristol, however, we
recognized an exception (other than a constitutional
challenge) to the rule and held that, in certain situations
where no quo warranto action is statutorily available, it is
permissible to challenge an ordinance’s validity with a
declaratory judgment action. 970 S.W.2d at 953. In Earhart
the validity of an ordinance enacted several years earlier
was challenged because the annexed area contained no
“people, private property, or commercial activity.” Id at 954.
See State ex rel. Collier v. City of Pigeon Forge, 599 S.W.2d
545, 547 (Tenn. 1980) Long and lean…annexations, so long
as they take in people, private property, or commercial
activity, by necessity cannot be challenged in a quo warranto
action because only an ‘aggrieved owner of property that
borders or lies within territory that is the subject of an
annexation ordinance prior to the operative date thereof may
file such a challenge.’ Tenn. Code Ann. § 6-51-103(a)(1)(A).
(Emphasis is the court’s). We held, therefore, that the action
for a declaratory judgment was permissible, but limited our
holding in two key ways. First, we permitted only challenges
to ultra vires acts, that is, test of the validity of an annexation
ordinance alleged to exceed the authority delegated by the
legislature. Earhart 97 S.W.2d 954. Second, we stated that
it is only where the quo warranto proceeding is not available,
[that] alternative equitable remedies are not barred. Id at
952. [citing 65 Am. Jur.2d Quo Warranto, § 7 (1972)]
(Where the remedy by quo warranto is available, it is usually
held that there is no concurrent remedy in equity unless by
virtue of statutory provision). [At 708.] [Internal quotation
marks, etc. omitted by writer]. [Emphasis is mine.]
Plaintiffs in Highwoods, said the court, failed in their claim for a declaratory judgment
voiding the annexation at issue, because:
Reduced to its essence, the challenge by Plaintiffs is to a
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single aspect of the court’s approved settlement of the
earlier lawsuit attacking the reasonableness of the
Ordinance. That is, the City’s consent to delay the planned
annexation of Area B until 2013. A delay in the effective
date of the annexation fits more neatly within the
classification of procedural defects, as defined in City of Oak
Ridge and City of Watauga-issues that we held must be
presented in a quo warranto proceedings and considered in
the context of the reasonableness of the annexation. [At
708-09.]
While Bristol v. Earhart may have been limited to annexation ordinances that took in no
person, private property, or commercial property, both Earhart and Highwoods appear
to open the door to annexation suits based on ultra vires annexations that are not
authorized by the General Assembly. If that is so, it is probably a very narrow opening.
With particular respect to annexations by referendum, it is difficult to say here what
kinds of annexations that category might encompass. One category comes immediately
to mind: annexations that are not contiguous.
GENERALLY – CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS
Highwoods Properties, Inc. v. City of Memphis, 297 S.W.3d 695 (Tenn. 2009), declares
that:
The importance of correctly resolving constitutional issues
suggests that constitutional issues should rarely be
foreclosed by procedural technicalities. Colonial Pipeline,
263 S.W.3d at 844-45…The stringent restrictions on any
challenge to an annexation apply only when constitutional
issues are not at stake. [At 709.]
In that case, the city annexed Area A and Area B, the latter of which became effective
later than the annexation of the former. One of the questions was whether the fact that
the population in Area A would pay taxes longer than the population in Area B violated
the tax equality and uniformity requirement of Article II, Section 28 of the Tennessee
Constitution. That issue qualified as a constitutional question, said the Court, but held
that Article II, Section 28 was not violated because:
“There is nothing in the record to suggest that the City of
Memphis or any other taxing authority is implementing
different tax rates within its own borders. Area B will not be
annexed into the city limits of Memphis until 2013, so it is not
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necessary that Area A and Area B property be taxed at the
same rate at this time. They are currently in different
jurisdictions for purposes of this analysis.” [At 710.]
But it is difficult to determine what other constitutional issues may arise in annexations.
Presumably, such issues could arise under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution as well as provisions of the Tennessee Constitution. But there is no record
of Tennessee annexations, by ordinance or by referendum, being overturned on
constitutional grounds. However, several annexation cases have put constitutional
issues in a special category, presumably in the event they should arise. See
Highwoods, immediately above [at 709], and Vicars v. Kingsport, 659 S.W.2d 367
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) [At 369-370]. Even hearing and notice procedural defects in
annexations have been resolved under state annexation laws. It was held in City of
Oak Ridge v. Roane County, 563 S.W.2d 895 (Tenn. 1978) that, “…the courts are not
expressly or impliedly authorized to void a municipal [annexation] ordinance for failure of
the municipality to give notice or hold a public hearing.” [At 896], and in City of
Wautaga v. City of Johnson City, 589 S.W.2d 901 (Tenn. 1979), that “…courts were
without statutory or common law authority to vacate an annexation ordinance for failure
to follow the procedures outlined in [what is now Tenn. Code Ann. § 6-51-102], such as
procedural defects in notices and public hearings.” [At 905.]
Substantive constitutional challenges to Tennessee’s annexation law have also been
turned aside. Article XI, Section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution, amended in 1953,
provides that, “The General Assembly shall by general law provide the exclusive
methods by which municipalities may be created, merged, consolidated and dissolved
and by which municipal boundaries may be altered,” which in 1955 resulted in the
adoption of Public Acts 1955, Chapter 113, Tennessee’s first comprehensive
annexation law. It was said of that annexation law in State ex rel. Balsinger v. Town of
Madisonville, 435 S.W.2d 803 (1968), that:
It is contended that this act is void because it is in conflict
with the fifth amendment of the Constitution of the United
States, which provides that ‘no person shall be *** deprived
of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor
shall private property be taken for public use without just
compensation’; and also because in conflict with similar
provisions of the constitution of the state of Tennessee, ‘that
no man shall be *** deprived of his life, liberty or property but
by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land (article I,
§ 8); and ‘that no man’s particular services shall be
demanded, or property taken or applied to public use without
the consent of his representatives, or without just
compensation being made therefore.’ Article 1, § 21…. As
a matter of course, the act would be inoperative, null or void,
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if, in fact, it violated any of those provisions. But it cannot be
that it does so. The extension of corporate limits so as to
include additional territory is in no sense an impairment of
the owner’s liberty. Nor is it a taking of private property for
public use. If it were held to be so, then no municipal
corporation could be established or enlarged, and none of
these valuable instrumentalities of the State would have a
lawful existence…. Even the statutes of annexation to which
complainants ascribe the sanctity of general laws would be
utterly unavailing for the same reason. [At 281-82.]
CORRIDOR ANNEXATIONS
Generally
Chapter 1101 set restrictions on how and when corridor annexations could occur during
the period before the countywide growth plan was adopted. Those restrictions expired
after the adoption of the countywide growth plans. T.C.A. § 6-58-108(c). But, corridor
annexations, whether done by ordinance or by referendum, must still be approached
with caution.
In State ex rel. Collier v. City of Pigeon Forge, 599 S.W.2d 545 (Tenn. 1980), the
Tennessee Supreme Court distinguished between “corridor,” “strip,” and “shoestring”
annexations on one hand, and “long and lean” annexations on the other. In that case,
the city annexed an area contiguous to the city about one mile long, the width of the
main highway through the city. The territory had a population of 47 people. In upholding
the annexation as reasonable, the court said:
We should emphasize that this is not, as appellants insist,
merely a “strip” or “shoestring” or “corridor” annexation,
although it is long and lean. Such annexations, so long as
they take in people, private property, or commercial activity,
and rest on some reasonable and rational basis, is not per
se to be condemned. We do not deal with an annexation
wherein a city attempts to run its corporate limits down the
right-of-way of an established road without taking in a single
citizen or a single piece of private property. Such an
annexation is perhaps questionable and is not here involved.
As in any annexation, and more particularly one where a
geometrically irregular parcel of land is annexed, the Court
must scrutinize the stated and ostensible purpose of the
annexation. [At 547.] [Emphasis is mine.]
There are two substantive points in Collier:

2014 Municipal Technical Advisory Service -- 54



First, by whatever name they are called, annexations that run down rights
of way or other artificial or natural features of land and that take in no
other territory or people are “perhaps questionable”; and



Second, in any annexation, particularly those involving geometrically
irregular parcels of land, the court must scrutinize the stated and
ostensible purpose of the annexation.

In a broad sense, most annexations are geometrically irregular, but Collier applied that
description to annexations that are not reasonably consistent with the planned and
orderly growth of the city. [Also see Hart v. City of Johnson City, 801 S.W.2d 512
(Tenn. 1990).]
Challenges to Strip, Shoestring, and Corridor Annexations
Generally, T.C.A. § 6-51-103 authorizes challenges to annexation ordinances by quo
warranto suits by property owners inside the annexed territory within 30 days following
the annexation. But in State ex rel. Earhart v. City of Bristol, 970 S.W.2d 948 (Tenn.
1998), the Tennessee Supreme Court held that T.C.A. § 6-51-103 applies only to
challenges based on the reasonableness of the annexation. It permitted property
owners annexed in 1995 by the City of Bristol to challenge by a declaratory judgment
suit a corridor annexation adopted in 1989; the territory annexed in 1995 was attached
to the corridor annexed in 1989. Citing State ex rel. Collier v. City of Pigeon Forge, 599
S.W.2d 545 (Tenn. 1980), the court frowned upon some corridor annexations, declaring
that “the 30 day limitation does not apply to declaratory judgment suits contesting the
validity of an ordinance which purports to annex an area that does not include people,
private property, or commercial activity and is, therefore, void.” [At 954.] [Citing Collier.]
In that connection it also declared that:
The majority of courts have interpreted the requirement that
annexed land be “contiguous” to not allow the annexation of
thin strips of land to connect a larger parcel of land to a
municipality. [Citation omitted.] .... These decisions articulate
the principle implicit in the Tennessee statute. [At 953-54.]
The challenge to the annexation in Earhart was based on the proposition that the
annexation was an ultra vires act.
“DONUT HOLE” ANNEXATIONS
Generally
Donut hole annexations rest on legally shaky ground in Tennessee. In City of Kingsport
v. State ex rel. Crown Enterprises, Inc., 562 S.W.2d 808 (Tenn. 1978), Crown
Enterprises challenged Kingsport’s annexation of 806 acres, which included an 85-acre
industrial park owned by Crown Enterprises and used by its subsidiary, Mason and
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Dixon Lines (M&D). The trial court found the annexation unreasonable for several
reasons: The 85-acre site used by M&D was industrial, M&D provided virtually all its
own services, and annexation of the M&D property was solely for the purpose of
obtaining tax revenue in violation of T.C.A. § 6-51-103.
In overturning the trial court, the Tennessee Supreme Court declared that, “The basic
fallacy in the trial judge’s conclusion is that he treated the controversy as if the CrownM&D Property were the only territory being annexed as opposed to being but a small
portion of a substantially larger territory being annexed in good faith.” The court was not
impressed with Crown Enterprise’s argument that M&D didn’t need city services
because:
The whole process of annexation would be frustrated if the
city could only annex those properties then in need of city
services. The result of this would tend to create islands of
unincorporated areas within a city and the archipelagic
monstrosity thus created would thwart the rendition of
essential city services and would not be in the public
interest.
Appellees do not contest the annexation of the remaining
property. Should we uphold their contention the result would
be the creation of an 85 acre island or enclave, completely
surrounded by the City of Kingsport. This area thus omitted
would be within, but not a part of a city. Absent the most
compelling considerations, such a situation would be
intolerable and an annexation that produced such a result
would not meet the test of reasonableness. [At 814.]
[Emphasis is mine.]
Kinds of Donut Hole Annexations
The courts in other states have gone both ways on the question of whether donut hole
annexations meet the test of contiguity where, as in the case of Tennessee, the
annexation statute does not define the term “contiguity.” Two kinds of donuts have been
issues in those cases: one where one or more parts of the donut hole actually touches
the city (technically, the donut is broken at one or more points) and one where the donut
hole is completely surrounded by the city. The weight of authority is that donut hole
annexations of the latter kind do not meet the test of contiguity. [See 49 ALR3d 589.]
City of Kingsport v. State ex rel. Crown Enterprises, Inc. 582 S.W.2d 808 (Tenn. 1978),
points to the prospect that the Tennessee courts could also follow the majority rule and
hold that such annexations are not contiguous, and for that reason violate state law
requiring annexations to adjoin the existing city. [See Chapters 4 and 5, Annexation by
Referendum, and Annexation by Ordinance.] Annexations by referendum or by
ordinance must be contiguous.
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Indeed, it would take only a short step for the Tennessee courts to connect Crown
Enterprise and Earhart on that point.
ANNEXATION BY ACQUIESCENCE
Two unreported Tennessee cases deal with the question of how the courts might treat
an annexation that is procedurally defective in some way but that has been treated by
both the municipality and the population in the annexed territory as part of the
municipality for a long period.
In King v. City of Watertown, 1986 WL 10696 (Tenn. Ct. App.), the city’s charter
required ordinances to be passed on two readings and to be signed by the mayor. The
annexation ordinance at issue in this case was passed only once on January 26, 1976,
and never signed by the mayor. The court held that the 30-day limit on the filing of quo
warranto annexation suits contained in T.C.A. § 6-51-103 did not apply because the
annexation ordinance had never been passed, but it also held that the “annexed”
territory was part of the city by acquiescence.
The court reasoned that:
1. The property appeared on the tax rolls of the city in 1978, and the plaintiff’s
predecessors in title paid city property taxes for the years 1978 through 1982.
The plaintiffs purchased the property on November 5, 1982, and paid city
property taxes for the year 1983 and business taxes in 1982 and 1983 for the
grocery and fruit market they operated there.
2. The city charges outside residents for water at the rate of one-and-one-half
times the rate it charges inside residents. The plaintiffs have at all times paid
the inside water rate.
3. The city provides free garbage pickup to city residents and to businesses for
$6 per month. The plaintiffs turned down city garbage service for their store.
4. The plaintiffs were provided city police protection.
5. All the county and city maps since 1978 showed the property as being located
within the city limits of Watertown.
6. The plaintiffs raised no question regarding being a part of the city until 1983
when they applied to the Wilson County Beer Board for a license to sell beer
at their grocery store. The sale of beer was prohibited inside the city of
Watertown. They were refused a license because the city of Watertown
contended the property was within the corporate limits of the city.
Citing Roane County v. Anderson County, 14 S.W. 1079 (1890), Putnam County v.
White County, 203 S.W. 334 (1918), and Putnam County v. Smith County, 164 S.W.
1147 (1914), for the proposition that a county could lose property to another county by
laches and long acquiescence, the court also pointed to several cases in other
jurisdictions in which it had been held that a local government can lose property to
another local government by acquiescence: City of Whiting v. City of East Chicago, 359
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N.E.2d 536 (1977); Sarry v. Lake, 28 P.2d . 80 (1933) (Calif.); LaPorta v. Village of
Philmont, 346 N.E.2d 503 (1976) (New York). It also pointed to Township of Scotch
Plains v. Town of Westfield for the proposition that “It has also been held that maps
published by authority of law may be referred to as evidence.” [At 4.]
In this case, concluded the court:
We are of the opinion that acquiescence over the long period
of time in the location of the municipal boundary by both the
municipality and the inhabitants of the municipality where
municipal action and improvements have been done under
the assumption that the property is located within the
boundary will support the conclusion that the boundaries
acquiesced in are the true boundaries...Here, plaintiffs and
their predecessors in title have acquiesced in the property
being considered inside the city limits of Watertown,
Tennessee. The property was originally zoned and
subdivided to the plaintiffs’ and their predecessors’ benefit
by and according to the zoning codes of the City of
Watertown. City services have been provided to and enjoyed
by the plaintiffs. City and county maps show the property to
be inside the corporate limits of the City of Watertown....
Plaintiffs acquiesced in their property being a part of the City
of Watertown until such time as it no longer suited their
purposes. Then, and only then, did they raise any objection.
[At 4.]
It is clear that a similar result would have been reached in White v. City of Townsend,
1995 WL 306877 (Tenn. Ct. App.), had not the city held two annexation referenda [the
first ended in a tie, the second in a defeat for the annexation] pending the appeal of the
trial court’s decision in 1994 that the annexation ordinance passed in November 1959,
was procedurally defective. The court at length discussed King v. City of Watertown and
declared that:
We are of the opinion that under the authority of King and
under the circumstances here the plaintiffs’ property was,
prior to this action, located within the corporate limits of the
City of Townsend. We are compelled to point out, however
that a Rule 11, T.R.A.P., application was made to the
Supreme Court for review of King v. City of Watertown.
Permission to appeal was denied, with the Supreme Court
concurring in results only, January 5, 1987. Since we are not
privy to the reasons of the Supreme Court for their action,
2014 Municipal Technical Advisory Service -- 58

we nevertheless accept King as an implicit approval of the
principle of “annexation by acquiescence,” since in our view,
the result reached in King could have been reached in no
other way except through annexation by acquiescence or
some form of estoppel brought about the acquiescence and
acceptance of city services. [At 7.]
But the court reasoned that “the action of the city in calling two referenda while
asserting the property in question is within the municipal boundaries of the city is
contradictory and an effective disclaimer of ‘annexation by acquiescence.’” [At 10.]
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CHAPTER 10
EFFECT OF ANNEXATION ON OTHER GOVERNMENTS
ANNEXING MUNICIPALITY’S RIGHT TO PROVIDE MUNICIPAL SERVICES
Two statutes generally address the right of an annexing municipality to provide
municipal services inside the annexed territory, including utility services: T.C.A.
§ 6-51-111 with respect to all municipal services except service provided by electrical
cooperatives, and T.C.A. § 6-51-112 with respect to services provided by electrical
cooperatives.
T.C.A. § 6-51-111 provides that following an annexation accomplished by either
ordinance or referendum:
… an annexing municipality and any affected instrumentality
of the State of Tennessee, such as, but not limited to, a
utility district, sanitary district, school district, or other public
service district, shall attempt to reach agreement in writing
for allocation and conveyance to the annexing municipality of
any or all public functions, rights, duties, property, assets,
and liabilities of such state instrumentality that justice and
reason may require in the circumstances. Any and all
agreements entered into before March 8, 1955, relating to
annexation shall be preserved. The annexing municipality, if
and to the extent it may choose, shall have the exclusive
right to perform or provide municipal and utility functions and
services in any territory which it annexes, subject,
notwithstanding § 7-82-301 or any other statute, subject,
however, to the provisions of this section with respect to
electric cooperatives. [Subsection (a).]
The same statute provides that:


Subject to the annexing city’s exclusive rights under the statute, any
matters upon which the parties have not come to a written agreement in
60 days after the operative date of the annexation shall be settled by
arbitration and review under the rules set out in the statute. [Subsection
(b).]



Where the annexed territory is being provided with utility service by a state
instrumentality, the agreement or arbitration award must protect the
bondholders and contract rights under the conditions of the statute.
[Subsection (c).]
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If a private individual or business entity provides utility services within the
boundaries of a municipality pursuant to a privilege, franchise, etc., from
the municipality, and the municipality annexes territory which includes the
service area of a utility district, the private individual or business and the
utility district shall attempt to reach an agreement for the latter to convey
to the former any or all public functions, rights, duties, property, assets
and liabilities of such utility district that reason and justice may require. If
an agreement is not reached, then notwithstanding the change of
municipal boundaries, the service area of the utility district shall remain
unchanged and the private individual or business entity shall not provide
utility service in the utility district’s service area. [Subsection (d).]



If at the time of the annexation the annexed territory is being provided with
utility service by a municipal utility service or other state instrumentality,
including a utility district, the annexing municipality can purchase all or part
of the utility system by delivering to the utility system written notice of its
election to exercise its right under the statute to be the exclusive service
provider. The purchase price and terms of payment shall be those agreed
upon by the parties. If the parties cannot agree on a purchase price, a final
determination of the fair market value of the properties being acquired and
all other outstanding issues related to the provision of utility services in the
annexed area shall be made using the arbitration procedures contained in
Subsection (b), above. Additional provisions governing arbitration are
contained in the statute. [Subsection (e).]

STATUTORY CONFLICT INVOLVING WATER AND WASTEWATER TREATMENT
AUTHORITIES
T.C.A. § 6-51-111 prescribes an absolute right by an annexing municipality to provide
utility services inside the annexed territory, but T.C.A. § 5-6-120 provides that
notwithstanding any other statute, “From and after the creation of a water and
wastewater treatment authority and the establishment of its service area, the authority
shall be the sole and exclusive provider of its authorized service in its service area,”
except that it can “cede all or any portion of its service area to another governmental
entity upon the [authority’s] board determining in its sole discretion that the public
convenience and necessity requires the same.”
In unreported City of Collegedale v. Hamilton County Water and Wastewater Treatment
Authority, 2002 WL 1765776 (Tenn. Ct. App.) Collegedale annexed certain territory in
Hamilton County, and both the city and the water and wastewater treatment authority
claimed ownership and control of sewer facilities in the annexed territory. The former
argued that under Tennessee Code Annotated, § 6-51-111(b) “subject to such the
exclusive right [of the city] to provide services in the annexed area under subsection (a)
of that statute” the parties were to arbitrate other matter upon which they did not agree,
the latter argued that under Tennessee Code Annotated, § 5-6-120 it had the exclusive
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right to provide sewer service in the annexed territory. However, the court did not
resolve the conflict between the two statutes; rather, it held that, “the language
contained in T.C.A. § 5-6-120(a)(1), above referenced is only applicable to areas which
have been ‘designated,’” and “it is undisputed that no specific designation of a service
area had been made as of the effective date of the City’s annexation.” [At 3.]
Presumably, the city’s right to provide utility service in the annexed area was ultimately
upheld.
Tennessee Attorney General’s Opinion 14-19 (February 14, 2014) opined that
Tennessee Code Annotated, § 6-51-111 took precedence over Tennessee Code
Annotated, § 5-6-120. It reasoned that an amendment to Tennessee Code Annotated,
§ 6-51-111(e) by Public Acts 2003, Chapter 93, (subsequent to the City of Collegedale
case, above) broadened that statute’s application from “electric service” and “electric
distribution system” to “utility service” and “utility system.” It concluded that:
Because there is an irreconcilable conflict between those two
statutes, the later-enacted provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. §
6-51-111(e) impliedly repeal the provisions of Tenn. Code
Ann. § 5-6-120 to the extent of the inconsistency between
the two. As a result, when an annexing municipality wants to
provide water and/or wastewater services in annexed
territory that is claimed to be within a WWTA’s existing
“service area” the applicable statutory provisions are those in
Tenn. Code Ann. § 6-51-111(e).
ANNEXING MUNICIPALITY’S PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION
Subsection (e), above, was added to T.C.A. § 6-51-111 by Public Acts 1998, Chapter
922, undoubtedly in response to the case of Knoxville Utilities Board v. Lenoir City
Utilities Board, 943 S.W.2d 979 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). The question in that case was
whether T.C.A. § 6-51-111 or T.C.A. § 6-51-112 controlled the taking by the City of
Knoxville of utility property owned by the Lenoir City Utilities Board in territory annexed
by the City of Knoxville. At the time of the annexation T.C.A. § 6-51-111 contained no
provisions for compensation to be paid by an annexing municipality for such property to
governmental entities covered by that statute, while T.C.A. § 6-51-112 provided for
compensation to be paid by an annexing municipality to electrical cooperatives for the
taking of such property. The Lenoir City Utilities Board did not qualify as an electrical
cooperative under T.C.A. § 6-51-112; rather, it fell under T.C.A. § 6-51-111 and was not
entitled to compensation for the taking of its property by the City of Knoxville. But
subsection (e) is limited to municipal electrical services and state instrumentalities,
including utility districts; it does not apply to utilities providing other kinds of utility
services or to electrical cooperatives.
The Tennessee Supreme Court in Hamilton County v. City of Chattanooga, 310 S.W.2d
153 (1958) held that a county is an affected instrumentality within the statute, and in
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City of Lenoir City v. State ex rel. City of Loudon, 571 S.W.2d 298 (Tenn. 1978), held
that a municipality is an affected instrumentality within the statute.
T.C.A. § 6-51-112 provides that if the annexing municipality owns and operates its own
electric system, it shall either offer to purchase any electric distribution properties and
service rights within the annexed area that are owned by an electric cooperative, or
grant such cooperative a franchise to serve the annexed area. Procedural details are
spelled out in that section.
UTILITY DISTRICTS8
Protection of Utility Districts Under State Law
In Hendersonville v. Hendersonville Utility District, 506 S.W.2d 149 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1973), it was held that although a city by its offer would acquire all of a utility district’s
assets and would assume all of its liabilities, arbitration was a necessary prerequisite to
filing of suit by the city to be allowed immediately to assume control and operation of the
system.
The court outlined some of the items that should be considered as subject to arbitration:
It is the argument of the City that since the City by its offer
will acquire all of the Utility District’s assets and will assume
all of the liabilities of the Utility District there is simply nothing
to arbitrate as the Utility District is a public agency holding
property by virtue of a trust in favor of the public and the City
occupies the same status. Therefore, it is only the matter of
a successor trustee assuming all the assets, whatever they
might be, and liabilities, whatever they might be, of the first
trustee. This being true, there can be no disputed issues
which would be the subject of a proper arbitration. It is
readily admitted, that if only a small portion of the Utility
District was taken over by the City and the Utility District
were to continue its operation in the non-annexed area, such
things as the value of the facilities received, the division of
liability for bonded indebtedness, etc., would be the proper
subject of arbitration.

8

Appendix G contains a resolution of the City of Jackson setting forth the terms and conditions for taking
over a utility district and a subsequent ordinance fixing water rates in the acquired area, a contract
whereby the City of Memphis took over the utility district in the Frayser area, resolutions adopted by a
utility district and Johnson City for this purpose, and a contract for the City of Clinton to take over the First
Utility District of Anderson County.
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We cannot agree with this argument. The statute does not
limit its application to cases of a partial take-over. It should
be noted that it is required by the statute that the parties
“shall attempt to reach agreement in writing for allocation
and conveyance to the annexing municipality of any or all
public functions, rights, duties, property, assets and liabilities
of such state instrumentality that justice and reason may
require in the circumstances.” The statute also contemplates
possible disagreements between the parties on the matters
to be attempted to be agreed upon for it further provides
“any such matters upon which the respective parties are not
in agreement in writing within sixty (60) days after the
operative date of such annexation shall be settled by
arbitration with the laws of arbitration of the state of
Tennessee effective at the time of submission to the
arbitrators, and subsection (2) of § 23-501 shall not apply to
any arbitration arising under §§ 6-309–6-320.”
We do not here attempt to list or limit in any way items which
could be in dispute and the subject of arbitration for such
attempt would be beyond the scope of this appeal, but even
when the annexing authority is to take over an entire utility
district, the date of takeover might very well be the subject of
disagreement and arbitration. In the instant case, that
problem is present as well as others. For instance, the
second paragraph of the statute provides for protection of
the bond holders to be an item of the agreement of
arbitration. Also, it must be born in mind in this case that the
City is going to, or so they say they will provide services for
members of the Utility District outside the annexed area. It
would seem to us that “justice and reason may require”
some sort of written agreement on this subject by the City
and release of the Utility District trustees.
We hold the arbitration as set out in the statute is a
necessary prerequisite to the filing of such a suit as this. We
think it would be somewhat difficult for the Chancellor below
to order a take-over of assets when a list of those assets is
not before the Court and the Chancellor has no knowledge
of what they actually are. This case involves more than
underground pipes and fireplugs, it involved service
equipment, bonded indebtedness, etc. As we view it, to hold
any other way would defeat the purpose of the statute, which
no doubt was to relieve the Court of having to supervise the
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dispute between the parties until some sort of agreement or
award had been made through arbitration which the Court
could either at that time approve or disapprove. [At 151-52.]
After the City of Memphis annexed an area that included a part of the area served by a
utility district, the city entered into an agreement to take over and to assume all
obligations of the district. Before the annexation the district had contracted with a
subdivision developer, agreeing to build water supplying facilities and to supply water to
the subdivision. The developer had deposited $88,456.90 with the district as the
estimated cost of construction, and the district agreed to refund the deposit by annual
payments equal to 50 percent of water revenues from its customers in the subdivision
for a period of 10 years or until the total amount of the deposit was repaid. The contract
contained a provision that in the event the ownership or contract of the district was sold
or transferred the balance of refunds would be paid in full at that time. The developer
sued to enforce the terms of the contract, and the Tennessee Court of Appeals, held
that the city was bound by the acceleration of refund provision of the contract. Pitts &
Company, Inc. v. City of Memphis, 558 S.W.2d 448 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977).
The City of Knoxville persistently declined to resort to arbitration in a wrangle with the
Fountain City Utility District that lasted for more than four years. Practically all of the
district had been annexed, and it was conceded by all that acquisition by the city was
the only reasonable solution. The utility district refused to go out of business, however,
unless the city would agree to use its surplus funds to reimburse its customers for their
“equity” in the system. As the successor public agency, the City of Knoxville was, of
course, entitled to assets in the form of surplus funds as well as pipes in the ground and
other properties. For that reason, its agreement to this disposition of such funds was the
equivalent of it making payment. Finally, to end the long dispute without recourse to the
courts, the city in 1966 agreed to a distribution of $387,500 in surplus funds, which the
district paid to the customers it was serving on December 31, 1965.
PROTECTION OF UTILITY DISTRICTS UNDER FEDERAL LAW
It is provided by 7 United States Code, § 1926(b) that:
The service provided or made available through any such
association shall not be curtailed or limited by inclusion of
the areas to be served by such association within the
boundaries of any municipal corporation or other public
body, or by the granting of any private franchise for similar
service within such area during the term of such loan; nor
shall the happening of such event be the basis of requiring
such association to secure any franchise, license, or permit
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as a condition to continuing to serve the area served by the
association at the time of the occurrence of such event.
[Emphasis is mine.]
This law applies even where the municipality has annexed the area in which it wishes to
provide utility service. The reason is that many, if not most, utility districts have
outstanding FmHA or RECD loans.
However, some recent cases have held or implied that where a utility district does not
meet the “service provided or made available” requirement of § 1926(b), it is not
accorded the protection of that statute.
The U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals (in which Tennessee is located) denied a water
district’s claim to the exclusive right to provide service in territory annexed by a city and
in territory that lay outside its boundaries. In Lexington-South Elkhorn Water District v.
City of Wilmore, Ky., 93 F.3d 230 (1996), the court observed that the water district
provided no water service in, and had received no requests for service from, any of the
disputed areas. In the annexed area, the water district had no facilities in or adjacent to
the disputed properties; in the 10 areas outside the limits of the annexed territory, only
one contained the water district’s main, and that main had been constructed after the
city had begun providing water service in the area; and in the other nine areas outside
the annexed territory that contained no mains, one of the areas had a main within 50
yards; the others ranged in distance from 0.1 to 0.4 miles.
Reviewing earlier cases on the application of § 1926(b), the court said that:
These cases teach that whether an association had made
service available is determined based on the existence of
facilities on, or in the proximity of, the location to be served.
If an association does not already have service in existence,
water lines must either be within or adjacent to the property
claimed to be protected by § 1926( b) prior to the time an
allegedly encroaching association begins providing service in
order to be eligible for § 1926(b). Based on the location of
Lexington-South Elkhorn’s distribution lines, it had not made
service available prior to the time that Wilmore began
providing service to the disputed properties.... [At 237.]
[Emphasis is mine.]
But language in that case suggests that had the district obtained the certificate of
necessity that water districts were required under Kentucky law to obtain with respect to
territory in which they claimed the right of service, the question of whether service was
“available” may have been closer. The court pointed out that Kentucky law required a
water district that had obtained such a certificate to make reasonable extensions of
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water service to all customers at least the first 50 feet, and a longer one where the 50foot extension was unreasonable under the circumstances. But immediately after
making that observation, the court declared, “Thus, a key factor in determining whether
a water district has made water service available is the proximity of the water district’s
distribution lines to areas in dispute.” [At 235.]
Sequoyah County Rural Water District No. 7 v. Muldrow, 191 F.3d 1192 (10 Cir. 1999),
declares that, “Courts are in disagreements about what is required to satisfy the ‘made
services available’ requirement of § 1926(b).” [At 1201.] It divides the cases into three
categories based on the kind of test the particular court applied to determine if the
service was made available: (1) legal obligation (under state law) to provide utility
service test, (2) “pipes in the ground test,” and (3) a combination of both tests.
The court in that case decided there was no state (Oklahoma) law duty to provide
service but declared that even if there were:
...we do not think that such a duty, standing alone, is
sufficient to meet the “made service available” requirement.
For one thing, to hold that a legal duty is sufficient to meet
the requirement would be contrary to the language of the
statute, which provides protection only against curtailments
of “service provided or made available.” 7 U.S.C. § 1926(b).
In addition, allowing a water district to meet the requirement
simply by showing a legal duty to serve may undermine the
principle goals of the statute, which is to “encourage water
development by expanding the number of potential users of
such systems.” [Citations omitted.] “Inherent in the concept
of providing service or making service available is the
capability of providing service, or, at a minimum, of providing
service within a reasonable time.” [Citing Bell Arthur, below.]
If a water association has a legal duty to provide service but
has no proximate or adequate facilities or cannot provide
them within a reasonable time, it is the customer who
suffers. For these reasons, we think that the second prong of
§ 1926(b) should focus primarily on whether the association
has in fact [emphasis is the court’s] “made service available,”
i.e., on whether the association has proximate and adequate
“pipes in the ground” with which it has served or can serve
the disputed customers within a reasonable time. [At 1203.]
The court sent this case back to the district court to make a finding of fact on the
question of whether the water association had “made service available” under the “pipes
in the ground” test.
Whatever confusion the cases create with respect to the question of whether the state
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law that requires a utility district to provide service to customers in its service area
should be weighed in determining whether service is “available” under § 1926(b),
Tennessee is among those states whose laws regulating utility districts do not require
such districts to provide service as a matter of right. For that reason, the “pipes in the
ground” test probably applies to Tennessee under Lexington-South Elkhorn Water
District and subsequent cases in other federal judicial jurisdictions.
The question of what is “available” utility service was hit almost head on in Bell Arthur
Water Corporation v. Greenville Utilities Commission, 173 F.3d 517 (4th Cir. 1999).
There, in 1994, the Greenville, North Carolina, Utilities Commission agreed to provide
sewer service to the Ironwood development. In 1995, the City of Greenville annexed the
Ironwood development, following which the Greenville Utilities Commission and Bell
Arthur engaged in a dispute over which of them should provide water service to
Ironwood. Bell Arthur already had a six-inch water line in the area, which it had paid for
with FmHA loans, but those loans had been retired. However, in 1993, Bell Arthur had
borrowed money from FmHA to finance the extension of water services in its service
area to territory that did not involve Ironwood.
Bell Arthur’s own engineers determined that providing water service to Ironwood would
require a 14-inch water line at a cost of $650,000. In May 1995, Bell Arthur agreed in
writing to provide both temporary and permanent water service to Ironwood and began
temporary service to a construction trailer there. However, Bell Arthur took no further
steps to provide water service to Ironwood until 1996 when it obtained necessary
permits from the state. In August 1996, Bell Arthur’s board resolved to borrow the
necessary funds to construct the larger water line, and in December 1996 borrowed $1
million from a private bank for that purpose. Apparently, the dispute between Greenville
Utilities Commission and Bell Arthur was already in court when Bell Arthur borrowed the
$1 million because the loan was “conditioned on the outcome of this litigation.” [At 521.]
However, the Greenville Utilities Commission had not been idle. In July 1995, it notified
the Ironwood developer that it would provide water service and had already ordered the
pipe to provide the service, and by October 1995, had constructed a 12-inch water line
to Ironwood. Bell Arthur continued water service to the developer’s construction trailer
until February 1996.
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina [972 F. Supp. 3951
(1997)] held that Bell Arthur was not entitled to the protection of 7 U.S.C. § 1926(b), for
three reasons:
1. It had paid the FmHA loans with which it had constructed the six-inch
water lines into Ironwood;
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2. The new FmHA loans it had obtained for water line extensions to an
area that did not include Ironwood were not directly related to the
service to that area; and
3. Bell Arthur was “not capable of providing the requisite service within a
reasonable time after application was made for the service.”
With respect to the first two reasons, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Bell
Arthur could not rely upon retired FmHA loans to invoke the protection of 7 U.S.C.
1926(b), but held that the 1993 FmHA loans that Bell Arthur had obtained to make water
line extensions to areas in its service area, but that did not include Ironwood, triggered
the protection of Bell Arthur under 7 U.S.C. 1926(b) for its entire service area, including
Ironwood.
With respect the third reason, the court held that:
....Bell Arthur is entitled to the protection of § 1926(b) only for
that area. On this issue, we agree with the district court that
Bell Arthur was not entitled to protection for the Ironwood
area because it did not have the capacity to serve that area,
nor did it have the capacity to provide such service within a
reasonable time after the request for service was made. [At
525.]
The court reasoned that with respect to § 1926(b):
Inherent in the concept of providing service or making
service available is the capacity of providing service or, at a
minimum, of providing service within a reasonable time. See
North Alamo Water Supply Corp. v. City of San Juan, 90
F.2d 910, 916 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that a water
association may establish the availability of service under
§ 1926(b) by demonstrating, inter alia, that it “has lines and
adequate facilities to provide service to the disputed areas.”
(Emphasis added)); see also Lexington–South Elkhorn
Water Dist. v. City of Wilmore, 93 F.3d 230, 238 (6th Cir.
1996) (noting that “an association’s ability to serve [under
1926(b)] is predicated on the existence of facilities within or
adjacent to a disputed property”). Having a six-inch pipeline
in the ground when a 14-inch line is necessary provides no
support to a claim that a water association has adequate
facility to provide service. We conclude that in order to enjoy
the protection of § 1926(b) for an area, an association must
demonstrate as a threshold matter that it has adequate
facilities within or adjacent to the area to provide service to
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the area within a reasonable time after a request for service
is made....We hold that Bell Arthur’s inadequate six-inch pipe
in the ground coupled with only a general, unfulfilled intent to
provide the necessary 14-inch pipe sometime in the future
does not amount to “service provided or made available.”
[At 526.]
Also see the unreported case of Dyersburg Suburban Consolidated Utility District v. City
of Dyersburg, 2007 WL 1859460 (Tenn. Ct. App.)
SCHOOLS9
A city desiring to take over a county school in an annexed area will need to negotiate
with the county. The opening sentence in the opinion of Hamilton County v.
Chattanooga, 310 S.W.2d 153 (Tenn. 1958) is, “The sole question in this case is
whether under § 9 of chapter 113 of the Public Acts of 1955, T.C.A. § 6-318, counties
are included within the phrase ‘any affected instrumentality of the state of Tennessee.’”
The question was answered in the affirmative, and the case was remanded for further
proceedings. The Tennessee Supreme Court did not prescribe the terms of settlement
between the county and the city. It may be significant that the court noted that Hamilton
County in its bill “prayed for . . . a judgment against the City of Chattanooga for the total
amount, supra, expended on said schools,” but refused to grant such relief.
Subsequently the county and the city reached an agreement that was summarized by
the Chattanooga City Attorney as follows:
In the first annexation, under Chapter 113, Public Acts of
1955, the City acquired a new school building from Hamilton
County. The County had issued bonds under the provisions
of § 49-715 of the Code, the interest and principal being
payable only from taxes levied on property outside the
corporate limits of the City. The City entered into an
agreement with the County to pay to it the amount of bonds
and interest as they mature, the bonds being serial bonds.
In the next territory annexed there were two school buildings
belonging to the County which had been constructed several
years before and bonds issued therefor payable on taxes
levied on all property in the County, including property in the
City. The bonds issued were divided between the County
and City as provided by § 49-711 of the Code. There had
been some additions to these buildings made from bonds

9

See Appendices H-1, H-2 and H-3, the explanations of which are indicated in the appropriate parts of
this text on schools.
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funds payable only on taxes levied on property outside the
City, and also the County has spent some of its capital
outlay funds received from sales tax, in making
improvements to these schools. The City entered into a
contract with the County to reimburse them the amount of
the capital outlay funds and to pay to the County annually
the balance due on the issue of bonds allocated to the
school buildings.
The County in each instance agreed to discontinue levying
taxes on property in annexed territories for the payment of
the principal of and interest on the urban school bonds.
The City has not paid or agreed to pay any part of the bonds
outstanding which were issued for school purposes payable
from taxes levied on all the property in the County, including
that within the City. The taxpayers of the City will continue to
pay on the County bonds, including the bonds used on
constructing buildings in the County outside the City.
Where it was alleged that the annexation of territory would reduce the county area liable
to taxation for the payment of principal and interest on rural school bonds and thus
impair the obligation of contract, it was held that this is not a justifiable issue in a
suit in the nature of quo warranto attacking the reasonableness of an annexation
ordinance. [See Cope v. Morristown, 404 S.W.2d 298; Spoone v. Morristown, 431
S.W.2d 827 (1968).]
Fairly serious problems developed in Davidson County and Knox County resulting from
large annexations by Nashville and Knoxville. The county judges of these two counties
were quoted in newspaper stories as saying that annexation without unification of the
county and city schools into a single school system would be intolerable, and this
position gained substantial support in both communities. The Davidson County problem
was submitted to arbitration, but the issue became moot when voters approved a single
metropolitan government, including a unified school system, on June 28, 1962.
Several problems arose from the division of a county school district by a new city
boundary that cut off county students from the schools they formerly attended. The area
annexed by Nashville included approximately 12,500 students, 2,600 of whom had been
attending schools outside the annexed area; an additional 1,650 students lived outside
but had been attending county schools in the annexed areas. Knox County reported that
14,840 students were attending 29 schools in the area annexed by Knoxville, 2,275 of
whom lived beyond the new city boundaries.
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A Knoxville city school official suggested as a solution to such a situation at one high
school that the county pay tuition to the city for the nonresident students and that the
city pay the county for transporting students within the annexed areas. If the tuition rate
is reasonable, this would seem a sensible solution; such tuition payments may be little
more than it would cost the county to educate the children directly, and the county
receives state funds for transportation that are not distributed to city systems. In
consideration of county transportation for city schools, a city might even agree to accept
county students at tuition rates equal to the net cost per student to operate the county
system.
The county judge of Knox County proposed that two high schools be retained by the
county on a basis of “law and common horse sense.” A precedent for such an
arrangement exists in Chattanooga, where a large county high school has been located
in the city for many years. Davidson County school officials proposed that the county
retain four of the 22 schools in the annexed areas because 40 percent of the enrollment
in these schools was from beyond the new city boundaries, but the city expressed an
intention of taking over all schools.
When an annexation case is in litigation, there usually is a considerable time lag before
the annexation is finally effective. During this time a problem arises as to building or
enlarging school facilities to take care of an increasing number of students attending
schools in the area subject to annexation. [See Appendix H-1.] The law provides that
during the time that any annexation ordinance is being contested, the annexing
municipality and the county governing body may enter into an agreement to provide for
new, expanded and/or upgraded services and facilities. T.C.A. § 6-51-103(f).
Preliminary negotiations between Nashville and Davidson County school officials on
existing school properties reflect typical conflicts in points of view. The county places a
replacement value of $11,262,732.37 on the buildings, sites, improvements and
equipment of 22 schools in the annexed area, which had an original cost of
$7,558,752.88, but an “asking price” was not specified. The city had previously offered
$6.4 million on the grounds that 40 percent of the total county property assessment was
in the annexed area, and this amount represented 40 percent of the total rural school
bonds outstanding against these schools. The city proposed no division of outstanding
countywide bonds issued for these schools on the grounds that city taxpayers had paid
and would continue to pay taxes for their retirement, but this was rejected by the county
on the basis that the city had received its ADA share of these bonds when issued.
Knox County officials stated that the loss of the property tax base in areas annexed
would make it impossible to issue rural school bonds (amortized by a tax levy outside
the city), and to issue countywide bonds to obtain the amount of funds needed by the
county would require an unreasonably large issue because of the required ADA sharing
with the city. A suggested partial solution to this problem, which received some city and
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county support, was that the city waive its share of such a bond issue if the county
would agree to apply the city share against the amount eventually determined to be
chargeable against the city for county school facilities taken over by the city.
Eventually an agreement was worked out between Knoxville and Knox County that
covered several of the problems discussed above. [See Appendix H-2.] The agreement
was negotiated by a “school negotiating committee” and ratified by both local governing
bodies. The negotiating committee was composed of two members of county court, the
county school superintendent, the county solicitor, one city council member, one city
school board member, the city school superintendent, and the city law director.
Twenty-eight schools, valued at $12 million, were transferred to the city. One school
offering a countywide special education program was continued under county operation.
The city agreed to pay the debt service on about $4 million of the outstanding rural
school bonds of the county that had been invested in the schools taken over. The city
also waived its ADA short of a $2 million countywide school bond issue, the proceeds of
which had been spent primarily on the annexed schools. Further, there was provided a
cooperative system of financing all future capital improvements. The later provision
includes ongoing planning and capital budgeting of all school facilities in both the city
and county.
Section V of the agreement covers the question of which pupils can attend which school
with or without tuition. Paragraph (D) requires tuition payments for pupils who resided
inside the city at the time annexation proceedings were begun and later moved outside
the city, including the annexed area. This provision has been cumbersome and virtually
impossible to enforce. All of § V has been rendered null and void by a subsequent
agreement reached in connection with the adoption of a county sales tax earmarked for
schools. The essence of the latter agreement is that tuition payments are entirely
eliminated, and the county provides transportation for city pupils on a reimbursable
basis.
A byproduct of annexation and the resulting transfer of county school facilities to the city
was the desire on the part of the county to raise its teacher salaries to the level of city
teachers. The cost of the salary increases would have required a large increase in the
tax rate (the county needed about $300,000 but would have had to raise in excess of $1
million to allow for the city’s ADA share of the levy). The city school system did not need
these additional funds at the time. Section VII of the “Agreement for Transfer of
Schools” was amended to provide for an additional payment to the county, permitting an
increase in county teacher salaries to the level of city teachers without raising the
county tax rate. In exchange, the county agreed to provide transportation for pupils in
the annexed areas for one year.
An extensive annexation by Memphis, in four phases (effective on December 31 in each
of the years 1968, 1969, 1971, and 1972), resulted in an arbitration proceeding with
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Shelby County involving 27 county schools located in the annexed areas. The county
asked for approximately $17 million, the board of arbitration awarded $1,917,904, and
on appeal a chancery court, in a consent order, awarded $8,213,768 to be taken from
future ADA funds due the city school system. The city’s brief before the arbitration
board, the board’s memorandum, and the chancellor’s consent order are reproduced in
Appendix H-3.
AGREEMENT FOR NEW OR IMPROVED SERVICES AND FACILITIES
During the time that any annexation ordinance is being contested as provided herein,
the annexing municipality and the county governing body (and/or affected school,
sanitary, or utility district) may enter into an agreement to provide for new, expanded, or
upgraded services and facilities (including, but not limited to, equipment, land, and
buildings) and capital expenditures (including sale of bonds) to finance such services
and facilities, which agreement shall include an equitable division of the cost and
liabilities of such capital expenditures between the annexing municipality and the county
governing body (and/or affected school, sanitary, or utility district) upon final
determination of such contested annexation ordinance. T.C.A. § 6-51-103(f).

2014 Municipal Technical Advisory Service -- 74

CHAPTER 11
“DEANNEXATION” AND OTHER BOUNDARY ADJUSTMENTS
CONTRACTION OF BOUNDARIES (DEANNEXATION)
There are two ways for a city to “deannex” territory, both of which are covered in T.C.A.
§ 6-51-201.
By Referendum After the Adoption of an Ordinance by the City’s Governing Body
T.C.A. § 6-51-201(a), presently provides that:
Any incorporated city or town, whether it was incorporated
by general or special act, may contract its limits within any
given territory; provided that three-fourths (3/4) of the
qualified voters voting in an election thereon assent to.
That statute is highly confusing due to several amendments. It is not clear on its face
whether the vote must be three-fourths of the city voters voting or three-fourths of the
voters voting in the territory to be deannexed. However, in light of the history of T.C.A.
§§ 6-51-201(a) and 6-51-202, the three-fourths vote probably means a three-fourth vote
of the voters voting in a city election.
Complicated reasoning supporting this conclusion follows: That statute derives from
Public Acts 1875, Chapter 92, and appears in Tennessee Code of 1932, § 3322, which
itself was a part of Article III of that code. Under Article III, a city could add territory or
contract its limits. With respect to the contraction of limits the city had to adopt an
ordinance authorizing a referendum on the contraction. The contraction had to be
approved by a three-fourths vote “of the voters qualified to vote in the election of mayor
and aldermen or governing body....” For that reason, the three-fourths vote in Article III
is, arguably, three-fourths of the voters voting in a city election.
Tennessee Code of 1932, § 3322, was specifically amended by Public Acts 1955,
Chapter 61, as follows:
Any incorporated city or town, whether the same shall have
been incorporated by general or special Act, may contract its
limits within any given territory, provided three-fourths of the
qualified voters voting in an election thereon assent thereto.
Public Acts 1955, Chapter 113, is the first general annexation law of the state. In § 10,
without mentioning Tennessee Code of 1932, § 3322, whether the referendum had to
be preceded by an ordinance, and whether the vote was a three-fourths vote of the
voters voting in the territory or three-fourths of the voters voting in the city, simply said
that:
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Any city incorporated under any Public or Private Act of the
State of Tennessee may contract its city limits within any
given territory provided three-fourths of the qualified voters
voting in an election thereon assent thereto.
Both of those public acts were codified in T.C.A. § 6-51-201(a) as they appear as
indicated above. Although the language relative to the “voters qualified to vote in the
election of mayor and aldermen or governing body” was dropped, it still did not limit the
voters to those residing in the territory to be deannexed.
T.C.A. § 6-51-202 does require that the referendum be held pursuant to an ordinance
describing the territory to be deannexed and requires that the deannexation be
approved by a vote of three-fourths of the voters. That statute is consistent with the way
it appeared in Public Acts 1875 and in Tennessee Code of 1932, § 3323, which, again,
applied to both additions of territory to cities and to the contraction of city limits.
By Initiative of the City’s Governing Body
T.C.A. § 6-51-201(b) provides a completely separate method of deannexation. It was
added by Public Acts 1984, Chapter 731. That statute authorizes deannexation by
ordinance upon the initiative of the city’s governing body, by a majority vote of the “total
membership of the city legislative body.”
However, a petition of 10 percent of the voters residing in the area to be deannexed that
is submitted to the city recorder within 75 days of the final reading of the deannexation
ordinance triggers a referendum on the deannexation. The referendum is held at the
“next general election.” Only voters residing in the territory proposed for deannexation
are entitled to vote. It requires a majority vote of those voters to approve the
deannexation.
It is not clear whether the “general election” at which the referendum must be held
refers to the next general municipal election or to the next general state election;
presumably, it could refer to either. T.C.A. § 2-1-104(a)(7) defines the term “election” as
“a general election for which membership in a political party in order to participate
therein is not required.” General city elections and the “regular November [state]
election held on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November in even-numbered
years” appear to meet that definition. [See T.C.A. § 2-1-104(25).]
Once an area is deannexed, the city may continue to levy and collect taxes in the area
to pay the excluded territory’s share of any debt contracted prior to the deannexation.
T.C.A. §§ 6-51-201 – 204.
CHALLENGE TO DEANNEXATION BY REFERENDUM
Only one case interprets the deannexation statute: unreported Rich v. City of
Chattanooga, 2014 WL 1513349 (Tenn. Ct. App). It dealt with deannexation by
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referendum under Tennessee Code Annotated, § 6-51-201(b). On the date of the
general election on August 2, 2012, a referendum was held in Hamilton and Marion
counties on the question of whether certain properties annexed by the city in 1972 and
1994 should be deannexed. The referendum, which passed 21-20, included the vote
from both counties. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s quo warranto and
declaratory judgment challenge to the deannexation, but overturned the referendum
election because it wrongfully disenfranchised some voters.
With respect to the plaintiff’s quo warranto claim, the trial court had held that quo
warranto was the proper claim, but had been untimely filed. But the Court of Appeals
held that quo warranto relief is not available in deannexation cases, reasoning that:
According to the plain language of Tennessee Code
Annotated, § 6-51-201, deannexation may be accomplished
in one of two ways, either through an election receiving
approval of three-fourths of the qualified voters or via an
ordinance receiving support of a majority of the city
legislative body…If annexation is initiated via ordinance,
however, ten percent of the citizens residing in the affected
area may file a petition opposing the deannexation, and a
resultant referendum election will be conducted…if a
majority of the voters fail to vote for deannexation “the
contraction ordinance shall be void.” This is the sole method
provided by statute for review of deannexation by ordinance.
[At 7.] [Emphasis is mine.]
Pointing to the function of quo warranto in annexation cases, the Court said:
As our Supreme Court has declared, “‘[w]ithin the four
corners of the quo warranto statute lies the entire jurisdiction
and authority of the Courts to review the actions of
municipalities in enacting annexation ordinances.’”
Highwoods Prop., Inc. v. City of Memphis, 297 S.W.3d 695,
708 (Tenn. 2009) (quoting City of Oak Ridge v. Roane
County, 563 S.W.2d 895, 897 (Tenn. 1976)). The Court also
noted that the right to challenge an annexation ordinance is
a “statutory right” that “in its very origin is limited.”
Highwoods Props., Inc. v. City of Memphis, 297 S.W.3d at
708 (quoting Brent v. Town of Greeneville, 203 Tenn. 60,
309 S.W.2d 121, 123 (Tenn. 1957).
Utilizing the same rationale, the legislature has provided a
statutory mechanism to challenge deannexation by
ordinance, which is to file a petition opposing the ordinance
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that has been signed by ten percent of the registered voters
residing in the affected area…A referendum shall then be
held at the next general election, and the voters shall decide
the fate of the proposed deannexation…Such is the method
of review provided by the legislature and this Court is without
authority to expand this statutory remedy…[At 7-8.]
With respect to the plaintiff’s declaratory judgment claims, the Court of Appeals,
rejected that avenue for such a claim in essentially the same language it used to reject
their claims under quo warranto, adding that:
The [Supreme] Court further explained, “[s]ubject to some
exceptions, a declaratory judgment action should not be
considered where special statutory proceedings provide an
adequate remedy.” Highwoods Props., 297 S.W.3d at 709
(quoting Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Morgan, 263 S.W.3d 827,
838 (Tenn. 2008)…. We conclude that the same rationale
applies to a challenge to deannexation by ordinance. When
challenging deannexation by ordinance, the statute provides
for a referendum election as the only remedy. Where, as
here, the statutorily provided review of a referendum election
was available to and successfully utilized by Plaintiffs, and
where the ordinance was invalidated by such action, there
should be no further review by the courts because such
further review is not specifically provided by statute. See
e.g. Highwood Props., 297 S.W.3d at 708. Plaintiffs have
not alleged that the passage of this Ordinance constituted an
ultra vires act…[At 8-9.]
The trial court’s reliance on Committee to Oppose the Annexation of Topside and
Louisville Road v. City of Alcoa, 891 S.W.2d 269 (Tenn. 1994) in defining who was a
qualified voter in the deannexation of the property in question, was proper held the
Court of Appeals. The trial court had interpreted the language in Tennessee Code
Annotated, § 6-51-201(b)(3) speaking of voters eligible to vote in the deannexation
referendum as “anyone registered to vote in either Hamilton or Marion County, who
resides on a lot, any part of which is part of the area to be deannexed.” [At 9] The
Court of Appeals declared that Topside & Louisville Rd., had held that the phrase
“qualified voters who reside in the territory proposed for annexation” in Tennessee Code
Annotated, § 6-51-105(a), includes the curtilage of the property of such residents, and
approved the extension of that definition to deannexation by referendum.
The voter qualification component of this case is distinguished from the voter
qualification component in the Topside and Louisville Road case in that it recognized a
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Fourteenth Amendment Constitutional issue in such elections. The Court of Appeals
agreed with the trial court’s decision that:
An election regarding a deannexation ordinance would
“invoke the protections against infringements of the
fundamental right to vote.” See e.g. Kramer v. Union Free
Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 629 [parallel citations
omitted by me] quoting Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections,
383 U.S. 663, 665 [parallel citations omitted by me] [“once
the franchise is granted to the electorate, lines may not be
drawn which are inconsistent with the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”) [At 10.]
BOUNDARY ADJUSTMENTS BY CONTRACT
Two contiguous cities may adjust a common boundary by contract to eliminate
confusion and uncertainty about its location or to conform the boundary to certain manmade or natural geographical features. T.C.A. § 6-51-302.
MUNICIPAL MERGERS
T.C.A. § 6-51-401 et seq. authorizes municipalities that share contiguous boundaries
and that are located in the same county to merge using one of two methods.
Resolution and Referendum
This method requires the governing bodies of municipalities proposing to merge to pass
a resolution (or joint ordinance in the case of a proposed merger involving a home rule
municipality) requesting a referendum upon the proposed merger. The resolution (or
joint ordinance) must be passed by a majority vote of the members to which each of the
governing bodies of the municipalities are entitled. The resolution states the name of the
municipality that will result from the merger and the charter under which it will operate,
which may be the general law mayor-aldermanic charter, the general law managercommission charter, or one of the charters of the merging municipalities. The resolution
may also establish the wards or districts of the new municipality if its new charter
provides for such wards or districts. The wording of the merger question that must
appear on the ballot is contained in the statute and takes into account the possibility that
the merger will involve a home rule municipality and that the charter of the new
municipality will be a home rule charter. The referendum must pass by a majority of
those voting in each municipality for the merger to become effective. If the referenda are
successful, the merger is effective 120 days after the certification of the election results.
Petition and Referendum
Under this method, 10 percent of the registered voters in each municipality may petition
for a merger. The petition must contain essentially the same information that must
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appear in the resolutions (or joint ordinance in the case of a proposed merger involving
a home rule municipality). The rules that govern the merger referenda under the
resolution and referendum method apply to this method.
T.C.A. §§ 6-51-406–409 govern questions pertinent to the continuation of ordinances of
the municipalities that have merged under both methods and the financial integration of
the “old” municipalities into the “new” municipality.
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